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PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 
 
Daniel J. Hemel* 
Eric A. Posner** 
 
 
Federal obstruction of justice statutes bar anyone from interfering with 
law enforcement based on a “corrupt” motive. But what about the president 
of the United States? The president is vested with “executive power,” which 
includes the power to control federal law enforcement. A possible view is that 
the statutes do not apply to the president because if they did they would 
violate the president’s constitutional power. However, we argue that the 
obstruction of justice statutes are best interpreted to apply to the president, 
and that the president obstructs justice when his motive for intervening in an 
investigation is to further personal, pecuniary, or narrowly partisan 
interests, rather than to advance the public good. A brief tour of presidential 
scandals indicates that, without anyone noticing it, the law of obstruction of 
justice has evolved into a major check on presidential power. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Can a president be held criminally liable for obstruction of justice? That 
question took on new urgency in the wake of President Donald Trump’s firing 
of FBI director James Comey in May 2017. While the president cited Deputy 
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein’s determination that Comey had 
mishandled the investigation into Hillary Clinton’s disclosure of classified 
emails, Trump later admitted in an interview that he “was going to fire 
[Comey] regardless of the recommendation.” Because Trump had also 
signaled to Comey that he was unhappy with the FBI’s investigation of 
former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, speculation arose that 
Trump had fired Comey to punish him for failing to drop the investigation of 
Flynn. This in turn sparked allegations that Trump had committed the crime 
of obstruction of justice, which consists of interference with investigations, 
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prosecutions, and other law enforcement actions with “corrupt” intent.1  
 President Trump was not the first president to be accused of 
obstruction of justice. The first article of impeachment against President 
Richard Nixon, which was adopted by the House Judiciary Committee in 
1974, accused him of obstructing the investigation into the Watergate 
burglary by interfering with an FBI investigation.2 The article also mentioned 
interference with the investigation by the Watergate special prosecutor, 
whose firing was ordered by Nixon.3 High-ranking Reagan administration 
officials were indicted on obstruction of justice charges related to the Iran-
Contra affair, and several of President Reagan’s opponents suggested that he 
may have committed obstruction as well (though those allegations were never 
proven).4 After President George H.W. Bush pardoned former Defense 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who was one of the Reagan administration 
officials charged with obstruction in the Iran-Contra scandal, Bush was 
accused of obstructing the investigation into his own role in the scandal.5 The 
House impeached President Bill Clinton in 1998, based in part on obstruction 
of justice.6 The allegations against Clinton included charges that he had lied 
and withheld evidence in a civil action and lied to a grand jury.7 Obstruction 
of justice controversies also entangled the George W. Bush administration in 
the wake of firings of U.S. attorneys,8 and the onetime chief of staff to Vice 
President Dick Cheney was convicted of obstruction.9 Amazingly, six of the 
last nine presidents, or their top aides, were embroiled in obstruction of 
                                                
1 See Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/james-comey-trump-flynn-russia-
investigation.html; Samuel W. Buell, Open and Shut: The Obstruction of Justice Case 
Against Trump Is Already a Slam Dunk, SLATE (July 6, 2017, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/the_obstruction_of
_justice_case_against_trump_is_already_a_slam_dunk.html.  
2  IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. 
NO. 93-1305, at 2 (1974). 
3 Id. at 641. 
4 See, e.g., Terence Hunt, White House Ready to ‘Take Lumps’ on Iran Arms Scandal, 
ASSOC. PRESS (Feb. 14, 1987) (quoting Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee); Evans Witt, Feminist Leader Calls for Female Leadership, Reagan 
Impeachment, ASSOC. PRESS (July 9, 1987) (quoting president of the National Organization 
for Women).  
5 Robert Nida & Rebecca L Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal 
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV.  187, 214–15 (1999). 
6 H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998). 
7 Id. 
8 See infra Section I.C. 
9 See Carol D. Leonnig and Amy Goldstein, Libby Found Guilty in CIA Leak Case, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/06/AR2007030600648.html. 
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justice scandals. The law of obstruction of justice has evolved into a major 
check on presidential power, without anyone noticing it. 
 But the claim that the president can commit such a crime faces a 
powerful objection rooted in the Constitution. Obstruction of justice laws are 
normally applied to private citizens—people who bribe jurors, hide evidence 
from the police, or lie to investigators. The president is the head of the 
executive branch and therefore also the head of federal law enforcement. He 
can fire the FBI director, the attorney general, or any other principal officer 
in the executive branch who fails to maintain his confidence. If President 
Trump can fire an FBI director merely for displeasing him, why can’t he fire 
an FBI director who pursues an investigation that the president wants shut 
down? 
 The president’s control over law enforcement is sometimes regarded 
as a near-sacred principle in our constitutional system. In Justice Scalia’s 
words, “Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a 
quintessentially executive function.”10 The principle can be given several 
justifications. First, as Justice Scalia notes, presidential control over law 
enforcement limits the risk of legislative tyranny: if Congress passes bad 
laws, the president can weaken their effect by refusing to enforce them or 
enforcing them only in limited cases. Second, the president is the only 
individual who is held responsible for the general operation of the national 
government. Given limited budgets, someone needs to decide on enforcement 
priorities, which means blocking some types of enforcement while 
authorizing others. That someone is, as a matter of custom and design, the 
president, whose synoptic vision and electoral accountability to the national 
public make him well qualified to perform that function. 
 But the principle of presidential control comes into conflict with other 
constitutional values. The first is the idea that no person is above the law.11 
No one thinks that that the president should be able to commit a crime and 
then call off the investigation of it. What if he murdered his valet? The 
second—and the more serious problem, as a practical matter—is that the 
president might use his control of law enforcement to hamper political 
opposition. It is obvious enough that it would be wrong for the president to 
order spurious investigations of his political opponents in order to harass 
them. But it would seem to follow that the president should not call off 
investigations of his political aides and allies (and of himself) in order to 
protect them (and himself) from legal jeopardy. If he could, then he or his 
aides could engage in criminal activity in order to harass their political 
opponents—as the Watergate burglary, a spy operation against the 
                                                
10 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
11 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974) (rejecting notion that “a 
President is above the law”). 
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Democratic National Committee, illustrates—without fear of legal liability. 
 The founders recognized this conundrum and sought to address it by 
granting Congress the impeachment power. Congress was not supposed to 
impeach a president merely because of political disagreement. Impeachment 
was supposed to be based on “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors”12—in Alexander Hamilton’s words, it was to “proceed 
from . . . the abuse or violation of some public trust.”13 The Senate was 
supposed to act in a “judicial” manner when it convened as a court to try 
impeachments. As such, it would develop a set of precedents that would guide 
impeachment proceedings going forward. 
 More than two and a quarter centuries have elapsed without the 
Senate determining whether presidential obstruction of justice is a high crime 
or misdemeanor that might warrant removal from office. President Nixon 
resigned before he could be impeached. The Senate split 50-50 on the 
obstruction of justice charge against President Clinton. Moreover, questions 
of impeachability and indictability are distinct—obstruction by the president 
might be a “high crime or misdemeanor” in the Senate but not a punishable 
offense in federal court.14 The latter question likewise remains open: 
President Ford’s pardon preempted the possibility that Nixon might stand 
trial on charges of obstructing justice while in the White House. For his part, 
President Clinton agreed to a five-year suspension of his law license and a 
$250,000 fine in order to avert criminal prosecution on obstruction and other 
charges.15 
 In this article,16 we argue that the crime of obstruction of justice does 
                                                
12 U.S. CONST. art II, § 4. 
13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
14 See Lawrence H. Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Basic 
Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 717 (1999) (“[I]t appears to be all but universally 
agreed that an offense need not be a violation of criminal law at all in order for it to be 
impeachable as a high crime or misdemeanor.”). 
15 Editorial, Mr. Clinton’s Last Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/20/opinion/mr-clinton-s-last-deal.html. 
16 This expands upon arguments we have sketched out, individually and together, in a 
series of blog posts and opinion pieces. See Eric Posner, Can the President Commit the Crime 
of Obstruction of Justice, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 9, 2017), http://ericposner.com/can-the-
president-commit-the-crime-of-obstruction-of-justice; Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, Can the 
President Commit the Crime of Obstruction?, II, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 10, 2017), 
http://ericposner.com/can-the-president-commit-the-crime-of-obstruction-ii; Daniel Hemel 
& Eric Posner, When Does the President Commit Obstruction of Justice?, III, 
ERICPOSNER.COM (June 12, 2017), http://ericposner.com/when-does-the-president-commit-
obstruction-of-justice-iii; Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, Meta-Obstruction of Justice, 
ERICPOSNER.COM (June 13, 2017), http://ericposner.com/meta-obstruction-of-justice; 
Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, Op-Ed, The Case for Obstruction Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion/the-case-for-obstruction-
charges.html; Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, Op-Ed, If Trump Pardons, It Could Be a Crime, 
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apply to the president, but it applies in a special way because of the 
president’s role as head of the executive branch. As defined by statute and 
precedent, the crime of obstruction occurs when an individual “corruptly” 
endeavors to impede or influence an investigation or other proceeding, and 
the word “corruptly” is understood to mean “with an improper purpose.” 
When the president impedes or influences an investigation with a proper 
purpose, he does not commit the crime of obstruction. The critical question, 
then, is when it is proper for the president to intervene. 
 Article II of the Constitution suggests an answer to that question. It 
vests the president with “executive power;” obligates him to “take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed,” and gives some other roles and functions 
like that of commander-in-chief. When these authorities empower him to 
achieve certain goals, he is allowed to drop or block prosecutions and other 
enforcement actions that interfere with those goals. For example, if the 
president intervenes in an investigation because he thinks that national 
security demands it, he acts properly and not corruptly. Likewise, if the 
president decides in good faith that a particular investigation or class of 
investigations represents a poor use of scarce enforcement resources, he may 
block it (or them) without committing obstruction of justice.17 But if the 
president interferes with an investigation because he worries that it might 
bring to light criminal activity by himself, his family, or his top aides—and 
not for reasons related to national security or faithful execution of federal 
law—then he acts corruptly, and thus criminally. The Constitution does not 
authorize the president to employ his office for personal or partisan 
advantage, and intervening in an investigation for that purpose is not a proper 
                                                
N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-
pardons-crime-russia.html; Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, The Obstruction of Justice Case 
Against Donald Trump, SLATE (July 27, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/trump_is_violating
_federal_law_by_pushing_sessions_to_go_after_hillary_clinton.html. We have benefitted 
from the writings of others who have considered the application of the obstruction statutes 
to President Trump in recent months. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Open and Shut, SLATE 
(July 6, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/the_obstruction_of
_justice_case_against_trump_is_already_a_slam_dunk.html; Frank O. Bowman, Sam Buell 
on Obstruction, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES? (July 8, 2017), 
https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/08/sam-buell-on-obstruction; Samuel W. Buell & 
Frank O. Bowman, Professor Buell Responds on Obstruction, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES? 
(July 10, 2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/10/professor-buell-responds-on-
obstruction. 
17 We take no position on whether the “take care” clause or any other provision forbids 
the president to refuse to enforce statutes for good-faith policy reasons; in any event, we do 
not believe that such action could count as “obstruction of justice.” We discuss this issue in 
section I.B. 
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use of presidential power. 
 In Part I, we provide background on the crime of obstruction of justice 
and on the president’s authority over law enforcement. We propose a test for 
presidential obstruction of justice that balances competing constitutional 
values in a workable way. While the application of the obstruction statutes to 
the president raises a number of novel legal questions, courts considering 
these questions would have several sources from which to draw. First, 
specific constitutional provisions support a broader structural inference that 
a president abuses his power when he uses his office to pursue personal, 
pecuniary, and narrowly partisan objectives. Second, ethical and legal 
guidelines that control lower-level law enforcement officials buttress the 
notion that prosecutorial discretion does not allow one to wield law 
enforcement power for personal, pecuniary, and partisan ends. While the 
application of the obstruction statutes to the president presents questions that 
are in some sense sui generis, these questions are in other respects analogous 
to the challenges addressed elsewhere in the Constitution, and to challenges 
that federal prosecutors routinely face. 
 In Part II, we address a range of complications and counterarguments. 
First, we address the problem of mixed motives. Does a president obstruct 
justice if he stops an investigation for both personal reasons and reasons of 
the public interest? We argue that he does if the personal reason is a but-for 
cause of the action. Second, we consider the argument that a crime of 
presidential obstruction of justice is inconsistent with the pardon power. 
According to this argument, since the president may pardon someone before 
that person has been convicted of a crime, and such a pardon could be made 
to halt an investigation, he cannot coherently be found criminally liable for 
obstructing justice. We reject this argument. Even if the pardon power is 
plenary (and we note several objections to that view), halting an investigation 
and pardoning a person are different actions, with different political costs, so 
there is no inconsistency between criminalizing obstruction of justice and 
allowing pardons. Further, we argue that if a president pardons someone in 
order to obstruct justice, the president may be guilty of a crime even if the 
pardon itself is valid in the sense of releasing the pardoned person from 
criminal liability. 
 Third, we briefly address the argument that all talk of presidential 
obstruction of justice is idle because the president cannot be convicted of a 
crime while in office. The problem with this view is that impeachment is at 
least partly based on criminal activity, so it may matter whether obstruction 
of justice is a crime. Moreover, it is possible that the president can be 
convicted of a crime while in office; and even if he cannot, he can be 
convicted after he leaves office of a crime that he committed while in office. 
 Finally, we discuss and reject the argument that the canon of 
2017] PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 7 
constitutional avoidance—the principle that statutory ambiguities should be 
resolved in a way that avoids difficult constitutional questions—cuts against 
applying the obstruction of justice statutes to the president. The avoidance 
canon applies only in cases of ambiguity, and there is nothing in the text or 
the legislative history of the obstruction statutes that suggests the president 
might be excluded. 
 
I.  ANALYSIS  
 
A.  Obstruction of Justice 
 
Obstruction of justice is an offense with roots in the nation’s 
founding. The Declaration of Independence charged King George III with 
“obstruct[ing] the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to the laws 
for establishing judiciary powers.”18 George interfered with the establishment 
of courts, not with particular investigations, but the principle is the same. 
While we won’t belabor this point, we note that if the king could commit 
obstruction of justice, surely the president, whose executive power is more 
limited, can as well.  
The first federal obstruction statute dates from 1831,19 and provided 
for the punishment of “any person or persons” who “corruptly, or by threats 
or force, obstruct, or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due 
administration of justice” in “any court of the United States.”20 This original 
obstruction statute has survived, with relatively minor modifications, to 
today, and is now codified as section 1503 of title 18.21  
Since the 19th century, Congress has added several more obstruction 
statutes to the criminal code.22 While the various statutes differ in their scope, 
                                                
18 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776). 
19 Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487. Prior to this, the crime of obstruction was not 
sharply distinguished from contempt of court. See Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal 
Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82 MICH. L. REV. 90, 97 (1983). The 1831 law 
limited contempt to cases involving misbehavior in or near federal courts, misbehavior by 
court officers, and disobedience of court orders. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. at 
487–88. Obstruction applied to misdeeds that occur farther afield. 
20 Id. § 2, 4 Stat. at 488. 
21 Section 1503(a) provides (in relevant part) that: 
 
Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2012).  
22 In addition to section 1503, two more obstruction statutes are particularly relevant to 
presidential conduct. Section 1505, added in 1940, provides (in relevant part) that: 
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all share three basic elements. First, they all contain a similar actus reus 
requirement: the defendant must influence, obstruct, or impede the due 
administration of justice, or endeavor to do the same. Second, they include 
the same mens rea requirement: the defendant must act “corruptly.” Third, 
they all include a scope limitation. Corruptly obstructing the administration 
of justice in the abstract is not enough for criminal liability. The obstruction 
must affect some sort of proceeding. 
 
1. Actus Reus 
 
To be guilty of obstruction under federal law, a person must—or must 
endeavor or attempt to—influence, obstruct, or impede a proceeding.23 In the 
run-of-the-mill obstruction case, the defendant is charged with altering, 
concealing, or destroying subpoenaed documents, or with encouraging or 
giving false testimony,24 but the obstruction statutes have been extended to a 
range of other activities as well.25 In one case, a witness was convicted of 
obstruction after he claimed memory loss 134 times in a 90-minute Securities 
and Exchange Commission deposition.26 In another case, a defendant was 
                                                
 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any 
pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United 
States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any 
inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either 
House or any joint committee of the Congress . . . [s]hall be fined . . . , imprisoned 
. . . , or both. 
 
§ 1505; see Act of January 13, 1940, ch. 1, § 135(a), 54 Stat. 13 (1940). Section 1512(c), 
added in 2002, provides (in relevant part) that: 
 
Whoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official 
proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both. 
 
§ 1512(c); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807. 
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (“influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice”); § 1505 (“influences, obstructs, or 
impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of 
the law”); § 1512(c)(2) (“obstructs, influences, or impedes . . . , or attempts to do so”). 
24 See Matthew Harrington & Benjamin Schiffelbein, Obstruction of Justice, 51 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1477, 1488–90 (2014). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (section 
1503 “reaches all corrupt conduct capable of producing an effect that prevents justice from 
being duly administered, regardless of the means employed”). 
26 See United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 752–54 (2d Cir. 1971) (witness’s “blatantly 
evasive testimony” can qualify as obstruction even though it might not rise to level of 
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convicted of obstruction for obtaining grand jury transcripts from a typist 
who worked for a court reporter service and then sharing them with the target 
of the grand jury probe.27 In still another case, a criminal defense lawyer was 
convicted of obstruction after filing a flood of motions in state and federal 
court knowing that they contained an inaccurate rendition of events.28 
The actus reus requirement does not require that an obstruction 
conviction be predicated on a single act. A “continuing course of conduct” 
that obstructs an investigation can be the basis for guilt.29 And as the use of 
the verbs “endeavor” and “attempt” in the obstruction statutes suggests, a 
defendant can be convicted of obstruction even if his effort to stymie an 
investigation does not succeed. Moreover, a defendant who is innocent of the 
underlying charge can be convicted for obstructing the investigation into that 
charge.30 Obstruction of justice is an independent crime.    
But of course, it cannot be the case that any action or course of 
conduct that might interfere with an investigation of any charge constitutes 
criminal obstruction. The criminal defense lawyer who moves to quash a 
subpoena thereby impedes an investigation, but that does not mean that she 
should go to jail. What separates the wheat from the chaff in obstruction cases 
is the mens rea requirement: to be guilty of obstruction, a defendant must act 
with a “corrupt purpose.”31 
 
2. Mens Rea 
 
What exactly does it mean for a defendant to act with a “corrupt purpose,” 
and thus to meet the mens rea requirement for obstruction?32 Four possible 
interpretations emerge from the case law. 
 One view is that a defendant acts “corruptly” whenever he specifically 
seeks to interfere with a proceeding.33 On this view, “the word ‘corruptly’ 
                                                
perjury). 
27 United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 672–73, 675–79 (6th Cir. 1985). 
28 United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 624–35 (7th Cir. 1998). 
29 See United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D.D.C. 1998). 
30 See United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 1999). 
31 See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 995 (1st Cir. 1987) (“When all is said and 
done, what separates the wheat from the chaff in this case is the plentitude of evidence 
developed at trial from which the jury could have concluded that [the defendant acted] with 
corrupt purpose . . . .”). 
32 Sections 1503 and 1505 also make it a crime to obstruct justice “by threats or force, 
or by any threatening letter of communication.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a), 1505. Our focus 
here is on harder cases in which the threat and force prongs of the obstruction statutes do not 
apply. 
33 United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 
1503(a)). 
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means nothing more than an intent to obstruct the proceeding.”34 But this 
view goes too far by interfering with accepted elements of the adversary 
proceeding. Everyone agrees that the defense lawyer who knows his client is 
guilty but gives a rousing closing statement that leads to the client’s acquittal 
does not commit obstruction, even though he endeavors to influence the due 
administration of justice. The problems with this view are even more acute 
in the context of section 1505, which applies to endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede administrative and congressional proceedings. Minority 
party lawmakers, executive branch officials, and political activists all seek to 
influence congressional inquiries. One does not commit obstruction of justice 
simply by participating in the hurly burly of interest group politics.35 
 A second view is that the term “corruptly” does not refer to mens rea 
but instead to the means by which a defendant obstructs justice. If the 
defendant acts illegally in the course of obstructing the due administration of 
justice, then his conduct falls within the ambit of the obstruction statute. 
Judge Laurence Silberman pointed out the virtues of this view in a dissenting 
opinion in the case of Oliver North, a Reagan administration official 
convicted of obstructing Congress’s investigation into the Iran-Contra affair: 
 
If the jury focuses on the means chosen by the defendant in his endeavor 
to obstruct, it would not necessarily need to probe the morality or propriety 
of the defendant’s purpose—something the criminal law ordinarily eschews. 
. . . The “means” view does seem to mitigate that problem since, for 
example, a defendant who bribes the chairman of a congressional committee 
can be said to have acted “corruptly” no matter how laudable his underlying 
motive.36  
 
One objection to this means-based view is that it renders the obstruction 
of justice statutes redundant with other statutes, so that obstruction serves as 
no more than a sentencing enhancement. If “corruptly” requires that the 
defendant’s act be independently unlawful, then the obstruction statutes 
merely enhance the penalties for an act that the criminal law already 
proscribes. In any event, as we shall soon see, the means-based view has been 
decisively rejected by Congress. 
 A third view comes from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in the case of 
John Poindexter, who served as national security adviser to President Reagan 
and who—like North—was later charged with and convicted of obstruction 
                                                
34 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (summarizing case 
law from other circuits without adopting this view). 
35 See id. (“No one can seriously question that people constantly attempt, in innumerable 
ways, to obstruct or impede congressional committees . . . but it does not necessarily follow 
that [they do] so corruptly.”). 
36 Id. at 943 (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
2017] PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 11 
in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal. The majority opinion in the 
Poindexter case suggested that the term “corruptly” in section 1505 should 
be read “transitively”: a defendant “corruptly” obstructs a proceeding when 
he interferes with the proceeding “by means of corrupting another.”37 More 
specifically, the majority suggested that the statute should “include only 
‘corrupting’ another person by influencing him to violate his legal duty.”38 
But the obstruction statutes had long been construed to apply to defendants 
whose solo actions interfered with a proceeding.39 Moreover, it is a puzzle 
why Congress would have wanted to punish defendants who encourage 
others to violate their legal duties but not to punish defendants who violate 
their own legal duties.40 
Congress decisively rejected the D.C. Circuit’s “transitive” 
interpretation. The False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, which 
abrogated the Poindexter ruling,41 provides that “[a]s used in section 1505, 
the term ‘corruptly’ means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by 
influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or 
withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other 
information.”42 And while the 1996 law on its face applies only to section 
1505, the legislative history suggests that the bill’s goal was to align the 
construction of “corruptly” in section 1505 with interpretation of that term in 
the other obstruction statutes. Senator Levin, one of the bill’s sponsors, said 
that the bill would “bring [section 1505] back into line with other obstruction 
statutes protecting government inquiries.”43 And indeed, several other courts 
had previously interpreted the term “corruptly” in other obstruction statutes 
to mean just that: motivated by an “improper purpose.”44 
                                                
37 United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
38 Id. at 379 (emphasis in original). 
39 See, e.g., United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (submitting false 
statement to congressional committee); United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(submitting false documents in response to IRS subpoena); United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 
751 (2d Cir. 1971) (evasive testimony). 
40 Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 391 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (noting strange result of the 
majority’s transitive interpretation). 
41 False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 3, 110 Stat. 3459 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b)); see United States v. Hassoun, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226–
27 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that “Poindexter’s holding ha[s] been overturned by Congress’ 
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b)”). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). 
43 False Statements After the Hubbard v. United States Decision, Hearing on S. 1734 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d sess., at 5 (May 4, 1996). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978) (construing § 
1503); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 642 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the word ‘corruptly’ in § 
1503 means a defendant acted with improper motive or with bad or evil or wicked purpose” 
(some internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 115 n.229 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting jury instructions stating that “‘[t]he word, ‘corruptly’, as used in 
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This fourth view—that “corruptly” means motivated by an “improper 
purpose”—is now the near-consensus view among the courts of appeals.45 
Yet agreeing that “corruptly” refers to “improper purpose” still leaves the 
question of what purposes are “proper.” The answer will depend on the 
actor’s role. The prosecutor who intervenes in an investigation because she 
thinks it represents a misallocation of law enforcement resources acts with a 
proper purpose. The citizen activist who obstructs an investigation because 
she thinks it represents a misallocation of law enforcement resources might 
well be criminally liable.  
The role-based nature of the mens rea inquiry does not imply that 
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from obstruction charges. Consider the 
case of former Pennsylvania attorney general Kathleen Kane, who clashed 
repeatedly with a Philadelphia prosecutor named Frank Fina.46 While she was 
attorney general, Kane allegedly leaked secret grand jury documents to a 
Philadelphia newspaper implying that Fina had bungled a probe of a 
Philadelphia civil rights leader.47 When her subordinates suggested that the 
attorney general’s office should look into the leak, Kane reportedly told her 
staff not to investigate the matter, and also asked one of her subordinates to 
take action to shut down a grand jury probe into the leak.48 On the basis of 
this evidence, Kane was indicted for obstruction of justice under 
                                                
[section 1503] simply means having an evil or improper purpose or intent”). 
45 See United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Acting 
‘corruptly’ within the meaning of § 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper purpose and 
to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede 
or obstruct . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 
1273, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (“corruptly” as used in section 1512(c)(2) means “with an 
improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific 
intent to subvert, impede or obstruct” an official proceeding); United States v. Arthur 
Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under the caselaw, ‘corruptly’ requires 
an improper purpose” (emphasis in original)), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 544 
U.S. 696 (2005); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that 
“we have interpreted the term ‘corruptly,’ as it appears in § 1503, to mean motivated by an 
improper purpose,” and extending that interpretation to section 1512); Brown v. United 
States, 89 A.3d 98, 104 (D.C. 2014) (“individuals act ‘corruptly’ when they are ‘motivated 
by an improper purpose’”); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 
705 (2005) (“‘Corrupt’ and ‘corruptly’ are normally associated with wrongful, immoral, 
depraved, or evil.”) 
46 See Charles Thompson, In Kathleen Kane v. Frank Fina, Bad Blood, Porn and Leaks 
Make for Mutually Assured Destruction, PENNLIVE (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2015/08/post_787.html. 
47 In re Thirty-Five Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, No. 171 M.D. Misc. Dkt. 2012, 
Notice No. 123, Presentment #60, at 9-12 (Sup. Ct. Pa., Ct. of Common Pleas, Dec. 19, 
2014), available at bit.ly/2vvozZW. 
48 Id. at 16. 
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Pennsylvania law.49 She was ultimately convicted of obstruction as well as 
other charges.50  
The Kane case suggests that a prosecutor who abuses her position to 
tar a political rival and then tries to shut down any inquiry into the matter 
thereby commits obstruction of justice. But what of a district attorney who 
drops an investigation of a popular celebrity because of a possible adverse 
public reaction that would harm his chances of reelection?51 Would it change 
matters if the district attorney’s decision was not political, but was based on 
his personal affection for the celebrity based on the celebrity’s role in a long-
ago television show? Case law provides little guidance. The Pandora’s box 
of hypotheticals does not mean, however, that prosecutors who abuse their 
power for personal, pecuniary, or partisan ends get off scot-free, as the Kane 
episode illustrates.  
The application of the obstruction statutes to the president in 
particular will raise sensitive questions regarding the president’s proper role 
in law enforcement. Section I.B takes up those questions. 
 
3. Scope Limitations 
 
The first obstruction statute in 1831 applied only to obstruction of justice 
in federal court. And while section 1503 on its face now applies to obstruction 
of the “due administration of justice” anywhere, courts have interpreted 
section 1503 to apply only to the obstruction of federal judicial proceedings 
(including grand jury investigations).52 Thus, obstruction of a federal 
                                                
49 Id. at 27. The language of the relevant Pennsylvania statute differs slightly from the 
federal analogue. It applies to anyone who “intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the 
administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical 
interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 
5101. Pennsylvania courts have understood the provision to apply when a public official 
“perform[s] . . . a discretionary duty with an improper or corrupt motive.” See In re Gentile, 
654 A.2d 676, 684 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1994) (opinion of Johnson, J.). 
50 Jess Bidgood, Pennsylvania’s Attorney General Is Convicted on All Counts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/trial-kathleen-kane-
pennsylvania-attorney-general.html. 
51 Cf. Justin Wm. Moyer, The Prosecutor Undone by a ‘Secret Agreement’ with Bill 
Cosby, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/02/04/the-prosecutor-undone-by-a-secret-agreement-with-bill-
cosby/?utm_term=.689dcd0b71ee. 
52 See United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620, 621–22 (W.D. Pa. 1956); accord 
United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted) (“A 
prerequisite for conviction [under § 1503] is the pendency at the time of the alleged 
obstruction of some sort of judicial proceeding that qualifies as an ‘administration of 
justice.’”); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting that the Ninth 
Circuit has “approved the decision in United States v. Scoratow”); United States v. Bufalino, 
285 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing Scoratow, 137 F. Supp 620) (“Falsehoods given 
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criminal investigation prior to the filing of an indictment would not come 
within the scope of section 1503. 
 Section 1505, enacted in 1940, does apply beyond federal court to 
obstruction of any proceeding pending before a “department or agency of the 
United States,” or before Congress.53 Just how far it applies has been a subject 
of confusion. For the first several decades after the statute’s enactment, courts 
routinely applied section 1505 to the obstruction of investigations by federal 
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.54 But in a 1981 case, United States v. Higgins, a 
federal district court held that section 1505 did not apply to obstruction of an 
FBI probe.55 The district court said it was “convinced, after careful 
examination of the case law and pertinent legislative history,” that section 
1505 applied only to agencies with rulemaking or adjudicative powers and 
not to purely investigatory agencies such as the FBI.56 
The “case law and pertinent legislative history” cited by Higgins offer 
little support for the court’s conclusion. Higgins relies on United States v. 
Mitchell, a 1973 decision in which the court stated that under section 1505 
“it was not a crime to obstruct a criminal investigation or inquiry before the 
initiation of proceedings within the scope” of that statute.57 But Mitchell fails 
to resolve the question of what proceedings fall within the scope of section 
1505; it simply notes that section 1505 applies only after such proceedings 
are underway. Mitchell, moreover, has since been rejected by the Second 
Circuit, which holds that section 1505 does extend to investigations 
potentially leading to criminal charges.58 Meanwhile, the only legislative 
history supporting the Higgins court’s conclusion is a 1967 House Judiciary 
                                                
before non-judicial inquiries are not encompassed within 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the federal 
obstruction of justice statute”).). 
53 Act of January 13, 1940, ch. 1, § 135(a), 54 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1505). 
54 See United States v. Abrams, 427 F. 2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1970) (Immigration and 
Naturalization Service); United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1020–21 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(Federal Trade Commission); Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712–13 (8th Cir. 1966) 
(National Labor Relations Board); United States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492, 493–94 (D.D.C. 
1964) (obstruction of SEC investigation); United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 699–
704 (W.D. La. 1949) (obstruction of Federal Petroleum Board investigation). See generally 
United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984) (“Agency investigative 
activities are ‘proceedings’ within the meaning of § 1505.”). 
55 United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Ky. 1981). 
56 Id. 
57 United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (cited at Higgins, 
511 F. Supp. at 456). 
58 United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States 
v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting Mitchell). Of course, the Higgins 
court did not know in 1981 that the Second Circuit would reject Mitchell a decade later. 
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Committee report noting that “attempts to obstruct a criminal investigation 
or inquiry before a proceeding has been initiated are not within the 
proscription of [section 1505].59 But again, the House Judiciary Committee 
report does not speak to the question of when a “proceeding” starts. 
 Despite its shaky foundations, Higgins has had a wide impact. A 
number of other district courts have followed the decision.60 A Justice 
Department manual instructs federal prosecutors to abide by it, telling them 
that “investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not 
section 1505 proceedings.”61 Indeed, in 2009, after federal prosecutors in 
Virginia won a conviction under section 1505 for obstruction of an 
investigation by the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Agency, the government 
confessed error and conceded that the conviction should be vacated (as it 
was).62 Yet the Justice Department’s practice with respect to section 1505 is 
far from consistent. At almost the exact same time as the Virginia case, 
federal prosecutors in Missouri also won a conviction under section 1505 for 
obstruction of an FBI investigation. On appeal, the Eight Circuit affirmed the 
conviction.63 Other circuits that have weighed in on the question have not 
spoken with a single voice.64  
                                                
59 H.R. REP. NO. 90-658, as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1760, 1760. 
60 See United States v. McDaniel, No. 12-28, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110475, at *14 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2013) (following Higgins and holding that FBI investigation is “not a 
‘proceeding’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1505”); United States v. Edgemon, No. 95-43, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 23820, at *18 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 1997) (following Higgins and holding that 
“mere criminal investigation” is “not a proceeding for purposes of § 1505”); United States 
v. Wright, 704 F. Supp. 613, 615 (D. Md. 1989) (following Higgins and holding that 
obstruction of investigation by U.S. Attorney’s Office does not fall within scope of section 
1505 because U.S. Attorney “does not, to this Court’s knowledge, have either rule-making 
or adjudicative authority”). 
61 See U.S. DEPT’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL 1727 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1727-
protection-government-processes-omnibus-clause-18-usc-1505.  
62 United States v. Adams, 335 F. App'x 338, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009). 
63 See United States v. Khnum Haim Hayes, 329 F. App’x 680, 681 (8th Cir. 2009). 
While the Eighth Circuit did not squarely hold that section 1505 applies to FBI 
investigations, it said, instead, that “[t]o the extent [the defendant] argues that an FBI 
investigation is not a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of section 1505, we conclude any error 
was not plain because there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this court directly 
resolving the issue.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Higgins). In other words, because the 
defendant had not preserved the issue below, he could not have his conviction overturned on 
those grounds on appeal. 
64 The D.C. Circuit has held that an investigation by the Inspector General’s office of 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is a “proceeding” within the scope 
of section 1505 because the office “is charged with the duty of supervising investigations 
relating to the proper operation of the agency” and because “the Inspector General is 
empowered to issue subpoenas and to compel sworn testimony in conjunction with an 
investigation of agency activities.” See United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1127 (1994). 
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It is hard to explain why section 1505 should apply to obstruction of 
an investigation by the SEC or the FTC but not the FBI. The text of the statute 
does not command that result, and logic does not recommend it. And yet we 
acknowledge that a defendant charged under section 1505 for obstructing a 
federal criminal investigation would have a plausible argument that in light 
of the muddled case law, the rule of lenity weighs against applying the statute 
to his conduct.  
But even if an FBI investigation does not come within the scope of 
section 1505, it might well fall within the scope of section 1512(c). That 
provision, enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,65 makes it a 
crime to corruptly obstruct, influence, or impede “any official proceeding.” 
The term “official proceeding” is defined to mean any proceeding before a 
federal court or grand jury, a proceeding before Congress, or “a proceeding 
before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by law.”66 Section 
1512 also states that “an official proceeding need not be pending or about to 
be instituted at the time of the offense.”67  
 There are two ways in which an FBI investigation might fall within 
the scope of section 1512. First, an FBI investigation might be considered “a 
proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by 
law.” Federal law explicitly authorizes the FBI to “investigate any violation 
of Federal criminal law involving Government officers and employees.”68 
Obstruction of an FBI investigation into official misconduct, then, might be 
considered obstruction of an “official proceeding” within section 1512’s 
ambit. Some federal courts have adopted the view that an FBI investigation 
is an “official proceeding” under section 1512,69 though others have rejected 
                                                
These factors distinguish the Inspector General’s office from the FBI, which has subpoena 
authority only in a small set of cases: investigations of federal health care offenses, federal 
offenses involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children, and offenses related to 
controlled substances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(A)(i)(I); 21 U.S.C § 876; 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, 
Subpt. R, App. The Sixth Circuit, meanwhile, has said that an investigation by the Food and 
Drug Administration is a “proceeding” within the scope of section 1505 because “the FDA 
clearly possesses ‘enhanced’ investigative powers,” such as the power to inspect the premises 
of businesses regulated by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. See United States v. Pugh, 
404 F. App'x 21, 26 (6th Cir. 2010). 
65 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)). 
66 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a). 
67 § 1512(f)(1). 
68 28 U.S.C. § 535(a). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Plaskett, No. 2007-60, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62944, at 
*12 n.2 (D.V.I. Aug. 13, 2008) (“To the extent [defendant] argues that the federal agency 
investigation does not constitute an official proceeding under Section 1512(c)(2), the Court 
is unpersuaded.”); United States v. Hutcherson, No. 6:05CR00039, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
48708, at *7 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2006) (“Government agency actions, such as the FBI 
investigation of the defendant, are ‘official proceedings’ under Section 1512, whether or not 
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it.70 Second, obstruction of an FBI investigation that leads to a grand jury 
proceeding might be construed as obstruction of the grand jury proceeding, 
which would bring it within the scope of section 1512. Recall that an official 
proceeding “need not be pending or about to be instituted” at the time of the 
section 1512 offense. The relevant question under the case law is whether the 
official proceeding “was foreseeable [to the defendant] when he or she 
engaged in the proscribed conduct.”71 Several federal courts have held that 
obstructing an FBI investigation that foreseeably leads to a federal grand jury 
probe does fall within the scope of section 1512.72 
To sum up so far: Federal law—through three different statutes—
makes it a crime to “corruptly” obstruct, influence, or impede certain 
proceedings. The actus reus requirement has been construed broadly to 
include any action or course of action that obstructs justice. While much 
confusion has surrounded the mens rea requirement, Congress’s intervention 
in 1996 clarifies that “corruptly” refers to actions motivated by an “improper 
purpose.” And finally, while the outer contours of the obstruction statutes’ 
scope are somewhat blurry, these statutes clearly apply to obstruction of some 
federal agency investigations—and to obstruction of federal criminal 
investigations under certain circumstances.  
 
B.  The President’s Role 
 
We argued above that whether an act counts as obstruction of justice 
depends on the legal role of the person who engages in the act. Because 
private citizens do not have any formal role in the legal system, except when 
they are jurors, any act by a private citizen to interfere with an investigation—
including destruction of documents and lying to investigators—will generally 
be “improper” and thus “corrupt” for mens rea purposes. Public officials with 
authority over law enforcement present a more complex situation. It is 
necessary to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate acts that interfere 
                                                
a grand jury has been convened because Congress intended to deter obstruction of more than 
judicial proceedings with Section 1512.”) 
70 See United States v. Ermoian, 727 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that 
a criminal investigation is not an ‘official proceeding’ under the obstruction of justice 
statute.”); United States v. McDaniel, No. 13-15, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187658, at *16-37 
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2013) (collecting cases). 
71 United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 378 (3d Cir. 2012); accord United States v. 
Martinez, No. 14-2759, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12146, at *23 (2d Cir. July 7, 2017) 
(government must prove that official proceeding was “reasonably foreseeable to the 
defendant”). 
72 See, e.g., United States v. Holloway, No. 08-224, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108387, at 
*15 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2009); see also United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651–52 
(1st Cir. 1996) (reaching same result under pre-Sarbanes-Oxley version of section 1512). 
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with an investigation. 
 What is the president’s role in law enforcement? The vesting clause 
of Article II gives the president “[t]he executive power,”73 and the take care 
clause instructs him to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”74 
Those provisions have been understood to give the president broad discretion 
over prosecutorial decisions.75 Just how broad that discretion extends has 
been a matter of considerable controversy. The Supreme Court has rarely 
weighed in. Its most extensive treatment of the subject in recent decades came 
in the 1988 case Morrison v. Olson, involving the now-lapsed independent 
counsel statute.76 Much of the discussion of presidential power over the last 
30 years has taken Morrison as its starting point,77 and so will we. 
 The story of Morrison starts with the Saturday Night Massacre of 
October 20, 1973. On that evening, President Nixon ordered his attorney 
general to fire special prosecutor Archibald Cox, who was then leading the 
investigation into the Watergate scandal. The attorney general, Elliot 
Richardson, refused and resigned, as did his deputy. Ultimately, it fell to the 
third in line at the Justice Department, Solicitor General Robert Bork, to fire 
Cox.78 
 That episode contributed to Congress passing the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978,79 which limited the president’s power over certain 
prosecutions.80 One provision of the statute created an independent counsel 
with authority to investigate allegations of criminal behavior by executive-
branch officials, including the president, and to bring criminal charges in 
court. Under the law, the attorney general had the responsibility to request 
appointment of an independent counsel upon receipt of evidence that a 
covered official had committed a federal crime. Once the attorney general 
made that request, his power over the investigation was sharply limited. 
Authority to appoint the independent counsel lay with a panel of federal 
                                                
73 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
74 Id. art. II, § 3. 
75 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (1986) 
(“The power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the 
Executive's duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws . . . .”). 
76 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
77 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1994) (“We begin with the narrow but revealing question of 
criminal prosecution, as presented in the contest over the independent counsel and resolved 
in Morrison v. Olson.”). 
78 See Kenneth B. Noble, New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate Dismissals, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/26/us/new-views-emerge-of-
bork-s-role-in-watergate-dismissals.html. 
79 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824. 
80 Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New 
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 n.10 (1998). 
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judges, not the attorney general. And under the version of the statute that 
existed at the time of Morrison, the attorney general could remove the 
independent counsel only for good cause. The president himself lacked the 
authority to remove the independent counsel or otherwise intervene in his 
investigation.81  
  The immediate issue in the Morrison case involved an independent 
counsel probe into whether a Justice Department official had committed 
obstruction or other crimes in his testimony to a House subcommittee 
regarding certain EPA documents. The broader question was whether the 
independent counsel statute violated the constitutional separation of 
powers.82 The Court concluded that it did not. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion acknowledged the “undeniable” fact that “the Act reduces 
the amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and, through 
him, the President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a 
certain class of alleged criminal activity.”83 But in light of the attorney 
general’s role in initiating the independent counsel’s investigation and his 
power to remove the independent counsel for good cause, the Court said that 
the statute “give[s] the Executive Branch sufficient control over the 
independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his 
constitutionally assigned duties.”84  
 In a celebrated solo dissent, Justice Scalia charged that the majority 
in Morrison had effected an “important change in the equilibrium of power” 
among the branches.85 In his view, “the President’s constitutionally assigned 
duties include complete control over investigation and prosecution of 
violations of the law,”86 and the independent counsel statute deprived the 
president of that authority. According to Justice Scalia, the vesting clause of 
Article II must be read to give the president “not . . . some of the executive 
power, but all of the executive power.”87 Since the conduct of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions is a “purely” executive function, it cannot be 
assigned to anyone other than the president himself.88 This view, according 
to which the president alone “controls” law enforcement and hence cannot be 
forced to share that function with other branches or autonomous bodies, is 
now known as the unitary executive theory,89 and for committed unitarians, 
                                                
81 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660-65 (summarizing statute). 
82 See id. at 665-69. 
83 Id. at 695. 
84 Id. at 696. 
85 Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 710. 
87 Id. at 705. 
88 See id. at 705, 733-34. 
89 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 659 (1994) (defining the unitary executive theory as the view 
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Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent is gospel. Some commentators believe that 
the majority’s opinion in the case is perhaps no longer good law.90 Indeed, 
the independent counsel statute upheld in Morrison no longer is the law: a 
series of inquiries, culminating in the probe that led to the impeachment of 
President Clinton, persuaded many people that the independent counsel had 
grown too powerful, and Congress decided to let the independent counsel 
statute lapse rather than renew it when it expired in 1999.91 
 While the rhetorical force of Scalia’s Morrison dissent is 
undeniable,92 even the staunchest advocates of the unitary executive theory 
understand that Scalia’s claim of “complete” presidential control over federal 
law enforcement cannot be taken literally.93 Under the founding document, 
Congress exerts control over law enforcement in numerous ways. The 
president’s appointments are subject to confirmation by the Senate, which 
means that the president may not be able to appoint loyalists to carry out his 
priorities. Congress defines most executive offices, which means that the 
president cannot combine or divide offices in the way that best advances his 
goals. And Congress holds the power of the purse, allowing it to threaten to 
withhold funds from presidents who do not respect Congress’ enforcement 
preferences.94 
 Since the founding, Congress has imposed numerous additional 
constraints on the president’s enforcement discretion. Civil service laws 
                                                
that the “President must be able to control the execution of all federal laws”). While Calabresi 
and Prakash trace the unitary executive theory back to the writings of Locke, Blackstone, 
and Montesquieu, see id. at 605-06, the phrase itself was rarely used pre-Morrison. See, e.g., 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 58, 97 (discussing 
“concept of a unitary executive”). For criticisms of the unitary executive theory, see, e.g., 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1994); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: 
The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001). 
90 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law, LAWFARE (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v-olson-bad-law. 
91 See Helen Dewar, Independent Counsel Law Is Set to Lapse, WASH. POST (June 5, 
1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/counsels/stories/counsel060599.htm.  
92 See Justice Kagan and Judges Srinivasan and Kethledge Offer Views from the Bench, 
STANFORD LAWYER, No. 92, Spring 2015 (quoting Justice Kagan as saying that Justice 
Scalia’s Morrison opinion is “one of the greatest dissents ever written and every year it gets 
better”). 
93 One account identifies three conditions of a unitary executive, which are fairly 
minimal: “removal, a power to act in their stead, and a power to nullify their acts when the 
President disapproves.” Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 89, at 595 (citing Steven G. 
Calabresi & Keveni H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992)). 
94 See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalor Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s 
Unitary Executive, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1155–56 (1999). 
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restrict the president’s power to fire or punish lower-level subordinates who 
fail to carry out his policies.95 Congress has created thousands of offices 
whose occupants are protected by for-cause rules, and the Supreme Court has 
for the most part approved these actions despite the unitary executive 
theory.96 While Justice Scalia saw the independent counsel statute as 
fundamentally altering the interbranch equilibrium, a more accurate view is 
that the statute marked a modest reduction in the president’s executive power, 
hardly detectable against the background noise of countless adjustments to 
the scope of executive power over the centuries.   
 Nor has anyone contended that the president can use any means to 
control executive branch officials. It has never been suggested, as far as we 
know, that the president enjoys the constitutional authority to reward and 
punish executive-branch officers by giving them bonuses or subjecting them 
to fines without authorization from Congress. These types of rewards and 
punishments are essential to control of subordinates in the commercial world; 
yet the president enjoys no constitutional entitlement to use them on his own 
subordinates. In practice, then, the president’s ability to control his 
subordinates is limited.  
The unitary executive theory also does not imply that the president 
can use his executive power to pursue any ends. The president would commit 
treason if he sought to stop an investigation in order to prevent the unmasking 
of an enemy spy in a time of war. The president would commit bribery if he 
called off an investigation in exchange for a payment from a suspect. This 
much is apparent from the fact that treason and bribery are impeachable 
offenses and from the fact that the impeachment judgment clause clearly 
contemplates the possibility of prosecuting a former president for offenses 
that led to his removal.97 
                                                
95 See Peter. L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative 
Law, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 701, 704 (2009). 
96 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619–620, 632 (1935) 
(holding that Congress may restrict the power of the president to remove officers of 
independent agencies). 
97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend 
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of 
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be 
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.” 
(emphasis added)). One might also argue that explicit immunity provisions elsewhere in the 
Constitution imply that the president is not immune from criminal liability for offenses 
committed while in office. The Constitution provides that Senators and Representatives 
cannot be arrested—except for treason and breach of the peace—while attending or traveling 
to or from a legislative session, and it grants them immunity for anything said in a speech or 
debate in the Senate or House. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Then-Solicitor General 
Robert Bork concluded in a 1973 memo that “[s]ince the Framers knew how to, and did, 
spell out an immunity, the natural inference is that no immunity exists where none is 
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 The president’s enforcement discretion is limited by law in other ways 
as well. Congress can compel executive officials to regulate98 and to enforce 
noncriminal statutes,99 and the courts can issue injunctions against executive 
branch officials and hold them in contempt if they disobey those 
commands.100 Whether the courts have jurisdiction to enjoin the president in 
his official capacity is less clear,101 though the issue arises relatively rarely 
because most laws are enforced by executive-branch officials at or below the 
cabinet level rather than by the president himself. There are also background 
constitutional norms, including due process, that the president must obey.102 
At the same time, it is widely accepted that the president has authority 
to refuse to enforce the law under certain circumstances. The president can 
very likely refuse to defend a law in a court that he believes to be 
unconstitutional,103 and he can probably refuse to enforce a law against 
violators on grounds of unconstitutionality as well.104 He can definitely 
allocate enforcement resources across laws (voting rights laws versus 
                                                
mentioned.” See Mem. for the United States Concerning the Vice President’s Claim of 
Constitutional Immunity 5, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 
1972, Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, No. 73-965 (D. 
Md. filed Oct. 5, 1973), reprinted in Eric M. Freedman, On Protecting Accountability, 27 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 775, 779 (1999). 
98 See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on 
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 276 (2003). 
99 See, e.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (granting a writ 
of mandamus against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission instructing it to comply with an 
act of Congress). 
100 See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental 
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
101 The Supreme Court has said that it “has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President 
in the performance of his official duties.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802–03 
(1992) (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1867)). It has also held 
that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the president is not subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, which constrains subordinate executive branch officials. See id. at 796. But 
it has “left open the question of whether the President might be subject to a judicial injunction 
requiring the performance of a purely ‘ministerial’ duty,” and it has said that the president is 
not entirely immune from criminal process. See id. at 802. 
102 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
103 See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-
general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act (informing Speaker Boehner 
that President Obama determined that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional and 
that Department of Justice attorneys would no longer defend the constitutionality of the 
statute in court). 
104 See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citing Frank Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. L. REV. 905, 920–
24 (1990)). 
2017] PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 23 
corporate fraud laws), or types of law enforcement (prosecution of drug 
kingpins versus users).105 He can set priorities and areas of focus. He may be 
able to refuse to enforce certain laws wholesale even if he disapproves of 
them merely on policy grounds, but this last proposition is the subject of 
heated and inconclusive debate. The extent of his discretion will likely 
depend on whether we are talking about civil law or criminal law, and 
whether Congress has tried to constrain him or not.106 
The ambiguity of the limits on the president’s enforcement power 
reflect an uneasy compromise among constantly-evolving policy 
considerations. The enforcement power must be, to a large degree, 
discretionary because of the nature of our legal system. Congress has passed 
many more laws than could be enforced in a mechanical way, and there does 
not seem to be any neutral, judicially enforceable standard for allocating 
enforcement resources among laws. Once it is recognized that law 
enforcement must be discretionary, the normative question about whether 
executive-branch officials should exercise discretion is settled. Is implies 
ought. But theorists have made a virtue of this necessity. They argue that 
because the president sits atop the executive, and is subject to electoral 
constraints, he is the best person to bear the responsibility of enforcing the 
law in the public interest.107 There is also the thought that if Congress can 
constrain the president’s enforcement power, the president would not serve 
as a check on legislative tyranny.108 
 The countervailing worry is that the president may abuse his 
enforcement discretion. Of course, it was this worry, which seemed more than 
justified in the wake of Watergate, that led to enactment of the independent 
counsel statute in the first place. But concerns about abuse of power extend 
beyond narrow cases of self-dealing and protection of political allies. 
Democrats argued that President Reagan exceeded his executive authority by 
failing to enforce environmental laws,109 and—two decades later—that 
President George W. Bush stretched the limits of his constitutional power 
through lackluster enforcement of civil rights statutes.110 Republicans argued 
                                                
105 See Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to 
Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 515-16 (2017). 
106 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .”). 
107 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 728–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the 
primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one” and that concentrating executive 
power in the President maximizes political accountability). 
108 See id. at 713–14. 
109 See Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. L. REV. 1119, 1125-
30 (2015) (summarizing debate over Reagan administration nonenforcement). 
110 See Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 
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that President Obama violated the take care clause by failing to deport large 
classes of illegal immigrants after Congress rejected a law that would have 
given them a path to citizenship.111 Critics of executive power worry that if 
the president’s enforcement discretion is truly plenary, then he can effectively 
veto laws that he does not like—at least, for the duration of the 
administration—even if an actual veto has been overridden.112 Such a view 
may seem inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, which gives primary 
policy-making authority to Congress. It is even more clearly inconsistent with 
the goals of the founders, who rejected a proposal to give the president 
“dispensing” power—the power to suspend laws—which was a controversial 
feature of the executive power in the hands of the British king before the 
Glorious Revolution.113  
 Hence the dialectic between power and constraint. The president 
should enjoy some core discretionary power but he cannot go too far.114 The 
Obama-era controversies have given rise to a rough sense that the president 
cannot control law enforcement in such a way as to make “policy” that 
Congress has rejected. But that intuition still has not been fully articulated in 
a satisfactory way. 
 The debate over presidential enforcement runs parallel to arguments 
regarding the discretionary power of lower-level prosecutors. Courts 
sometimes say that federal prosecutors, or the attorney general, enjoy 
absolute discretion to decide whether to pursue charges in criminal cases.115 
                                                
DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 77, 81-82 (2009). 
111 See Brief of Governor Abbott, Governor Bentley, Governor Christie, Governor 
Daugaard, Governor Martinez, and Governor Walker as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 5, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) (arguing that 
the president’s Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) rule constitutes “an 
unconstitutional dispensation of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] under the Take Care 
Clause”). 
112 Markowitz, supra note 105, at 492 (“Taken to its extreme, the power not to enforce 
could act as a constitutionally suspect second veto for a broad swath of legislation.”). 
113 See Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: Parliament’s Attack Upon the Royal 
Dispensing Power 1597–1689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 198–99 (1985) (describing the 
crown’s dispensing power). 
114 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1711 (2004) (“Courts should review those claims that 
challenge particular nonenforcement decisions for lack of adequate explanation tending to 
indicate the absence of relevant factors or the presence of impermissible ones . . . .”). 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he courts are 
not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the 
United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”). See also, Wayte v. United States, 
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)) (“[S]o 
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense 
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring 
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”); Smith v. United States, 375 
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But such claims are overbroad. The courts have acknowledged that 
constitutional limitations, including due process, apply to prosecutorial 
discretion.116 The Supreme Court has declared that the prosecutor must be 
“disinterested.”117 Numerous cases confirm that the principle of prosecutorial 
discretion does not entitle the prosecutor to bring charges when she has a 
conflict of interest.118 Likewise, constitutional tort claims can be brought 
against prosecutors for extreme abuses of prosecutorial discretion, for 
example, when they agree to drop cases in return for bribes or sexual favors, 
or when they demand that a defendant swear a religious oath.119  
 It is true that complaints about abuse of prosecutorial discretion 
typically lead to judicial remedies when prosecutors bring cases, not when 
they refuse to bring cases. For obvious reasons, criminal defendants never try 
to persuade the court to compel the prosecutor to bring charges against other 
people, in order to produce equality of outcomes but not an outcome desired 
by the defendant. The pattern might cause one to think that the law gives 
more freedom to prosecutors not to bring cases than to bring cases. But the 
law has never been defined this way.120 The pattern reflects a remedial 
asymmetry. When a defendant complains about a prosecutor’s bias, a court 
can easily offer a remedy by releasing the defendant or ordering the 
prosecutor off the case. When a prosecutor’s bias results in a failure to bring 
a case, it is harder for the court to do anything about it. Judges, as they have 
recognized, are in a poor position to order prosecutors to bring cases, which 
would require the court to supervise the case to ensure that the prosecutor 
does not skimp on effort or resources.121 But this asymmetry does not mean 
that a biased prosecutor’s refusal to bring charges is lawful; rather, it is illegal 
                                                
F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted) (“The discretion of the Attorney General in 
choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution already 
started, is absolute.”); Shade v. Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 394 F. Supp 
1237, 1241 (M.D. Penn. 1975) (citations omitted) (“[T]he discretion to choose which statute 
to prosecute under is vested in the prosecuting attorney.”). 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United 
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)). 
117 Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
118 See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that the 
prosecutor’s conflict of interest “violate[d] the requirement of fundamental fairness assured 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
119 See, e.g., Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 504 (2nd Cir. 2004) (citing 
Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d 287, 291–92 (2nd Cir. 1989); and Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 
1210 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
120 The law, 28 U.S.C. § 528, and DOJ regulations do not make this distinction but forbid 
any kind of conflict of interest, regardless of its effect on prosecutors’ decisions. 
121 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (“Judicial deference to the 
decisions of these executive officers rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence 
of prosecutors and courts.”). 
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but hard to remedy. 
 With respect to the scope of the president’s enforcement discretion, 
these precedents involving lower-level prosecutors are instructive, but they 
are not determinative. One can certainly argue that the president, given the 
greater breadth of his portfolio and his more direct accountability to the 
electorate, ought to have wider discretion over enforcement decisions than a 
lower-level prosecutor might. Roger Taney, who subsequently served as 
chief justice and ensured his own infamy as the author of the Dred Scott 
decision, articulated an early version of this argument while he was President 
Jackson’s attorney general.122 President Jackson had directed a federal 
prosecutor to drop a controversial case involving jewels that were stolen from 
a Dutch princess. The secretary of state asked the attorney general whether 
the president’s action was lawful. In his Jewels of the Princess Orange 
opinion, Taney concluded that it was. While conceding that it would have 
been improper for the prosecutor to dismiss the case on his own,123 Taney 
said that it was “within the legitimate power of the President to direct [the 
prosecutor] to institute or to discontinue a pending suit . . . whenever the 
interest of the United States is directly or indirectly concerned.”124 
 Yet notably, neither Taney in Jewels of the Princess Orange nor 
Scalia in Morrison argued that the president’s prosecutorial discretion grants 
him the power to pursue or drop a case for any reason whatsoever.125 Other 
advocates of the unitary executive theory do not make that claim either, and 
such an argument would be inconsistent with the constitutional framework. 
As we have noted above, the founders anticipated that the laws against 
treason and bribery would apply to the president, and that the president might 
be prosecuted after impeachment and removal for committing those offenses 
while in office. The founders further anticipated that Congress would define 
other “high crimes” that might form the basis for the president’s 
                                                
122 The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831). 
123 See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. at 490 (“[A]s matters now stand, [the federal district attorney 
and the court] could not, with propriety, act on their own judgment, without previously 
understanding the views entertained by the Executive; and the prosecution must go on, even 
if, in point of fact, it is groundless and unjust, unless the President may lawfully interfere, 
and authorize and direct the district attorney to strike it off.”). 
124 Id. at 492; see also Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1031, 1052 (2013) (stating that Taney’s opinion “illustrates the degree to which 
enforcement decisions regarding the most pressing issues facing the country have been 
thought to be at the core of the President’s authority and responsibility”). 
125 Justice Scalia suggested that the foreign relations consequences of a law enforcement 
action should be relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But while he said that 
such considerations could be considered “political,” he emphasized that they were political 
“in the nonpartisan sense.” See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, even 
Justice Scalia appeared to accept the proposition that intervening in an investigation for 
partisan purposes would be improper. 
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impeachment, removal, and subsequent prosecution. Since obstruction of 
justice is one such crime, and one very much like certain kinds of bribery, it 
would seem to apply to the president as well. At the same time, as the analysis 
above illustrates, it cannot be applied to the president without some 
accommodation for his unique role in the constitutional scheme. 
 
C.  Historical Precedents 
 
The obstruction allegations against President Trump do not present the 
first time in modern American history that a sitting president or high-ranking 
White House officials have been accused of obstruction. In this section we 
review four previous episodes involving accusations of obstruction by the 
president or his closest advisers: the Watergate scandal, the Iran-Contra 
affair, the impeachment of Bill Clinton, and the controversy over the firing 
of nine U.S. attorneys in 2006. These episodes provide support for the notions 
that a president who uses his position of power to obstruct a federal 
investigation or proceeding commits an impeachable offense, and that 
interference in a criminal investigation for partisan advantage falls within the 
definition of obstruction. 
 
1. Watergate 
 
The first sitting president to face serious allegations of obstruction 
was Richard Nixon, who was accused of interfering with the FBI’s 
investigation into the break-in at the Democratic National Committee’s 
Watergate headquarters. The first article of impeachment reported out by the 
House Judiciary Committee in July 1974 charged that Nixon had “prevented, 
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice” through (among other 
means) “endeavouring to interfere with the conduct of investigations” by the 
Justice Department and the FBI and “endeavouring to misuse the Central 
Intelligence Agency.”126 The “smoking gun” in the Watergate scandal was a 
tape-recorded conversation from June 1972 in which Nixon and his chief of 
staff H.R. Haldeman concocted a plan to instruct the CIA deputy chief to tell 
the FBI director to call off the bureau’s probe into the Watergate burglary.127 
The vote on the first article of impeachment was 27-11, with six 
Republicans joining all 21 of the committee’s Democrats in the majority.128 
After Nixon’s resignation, however, all 11 Republicans who voted against 
                                                
126 IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, supra note 2, at 2. 
127 Andrew Martin, The Smoking Gun That Took Down Nixon: One From the History 
Books, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-
16/the-smoking-gun-that-took-down-nixon-one-from-the-history-books. 
128 IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, supra note 2, at 10. 
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the first article of impeachment submitted a statement acknowledging that, in 
light of subsequent revelations, they believed that Nixon had committed 
obstruction.129 Nixon himself, while contesting the factual allegations against 
him, acknowledged at a press conference prior to leaving office that “of 
course, the crime of obstruction of justice is a serious crime and would be an 
impeachable offense.”130 Thus, while the Watergate affair did not result in a 
judicial ruling or a precedent of the full House or Senate to the effect that the 
crime of obstruction applies to presidential interference in a federal criminal 
investigation, the episode did reveal a bipartisan consensus—with which 
Nixon himself concurred—that the president did not stand above the 
obstruction laws. 
There is a subtle question as to whether the Nixon case supports the 
view that the president can commit a crime of obstruction of justice or rather 
that obstruction by the president is a political offense that may justify 
impeachment but is not a crime. The eleven Republican minority members 
of the House Judiciary Committee who initially voted against impeachment 
but subsequently switched their views on the first article made clear that they 
took the former position: Nixon, in their final analysis, violated the criminal 
obstruction statutes.131 One member who voted in favor of impeachment 
likewise voiced the view that Nixon’s obstruction was not only impeachable 
but also criminal.132 
An alternative approach to the question of whether Nixon’s 
obstruction was a crime is to imagine what would have happened if Ford had 
not pardoned Nixon; would he have been convicted of obstruction? Probably: 
                                                
129 Id. at 361 (statement of Representative Hutchinson et al.); see also id. at 493 
(statement of Representative Mayne). 
130 The President’s News Conference (Mar. 6, 1974), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley eds., 2017), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4377. 
131 The minority members concluded: 
 
We recognize that the majority of the Committee, as well as its Special 
Counsel, apparently do not consider it necessary or appropriate to charge 
impeachable offenses in terms of the violation of specific Federal criminal statutes, 
such as Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), § 1001 (false statements to a government 
agency), or §§ 1503, 1505 and 1510 (obstruction of justice). . . . We disagree. To 
the contrary, we believe the evidence warrants the conclusion that the President did 
conspire with a number of his aides and subordinates to delay, impede and obstruct 
the investigation of the Watergate affair by the Department of Justice. 
 
IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, supra note 2, at 382 (statement of Representative 
Hutchinson et al.). 
132 See 1 Debate on Articles of Impeachment, Hearings of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 307 (1974) (statement of Representative Railsback). It is not clear 
whether others who voted for the first article shared Representative Railsback’s view. 
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the pardon itself implies that Ford believed that Nixon faced criminal liability 
of some sort, but we do not know whether Nixon would have faced criminal 
liability for obstruction of justice rather than for other offenses. At a 
minimum, though, we know that at least a dozen members of the House 
Judiciary Committee did think that a president could commit the crime of 
obstruction. That is one point in favor of the view that obstruction laws apply 
to the president, though it falls well short of resolving the matter. 
 
2. Iran-Contra 
 
In November 1986, news broke that Reagan administration officials had 
facilitated the sale of weapons to the Iranian government and used some of 
the proceeds to finance the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, notwithstanding a 
congressional prohibition on aid to the Contras. Two Reagan administration 
officials—national security adviser John Poindexter and National Security 
Council staffer Oliver North—would be convicted of obstructing a 
congressional inquiry into the Iran-Contra affair, but their convictions were 
later vacated.133 A third official, former Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger, was indicted for obstruction of justice in 1992 but pardoned by 
then-President George H.W. Bush before going to trial.134  
During his investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, independent 
counsel Lawrence Walsh considered whether obstruction charges should be 
filed against President Reagan. Walsh ultimately decided not to pursue such 
charges, explaining that “the fundamental reason for lack of prosecutorial 
effort was the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the President 
knew that the statements being made to Congress were false, or that acts of 
obstruction were being committed by Poindexter, North and others.”135 
Walsh also considered obstruction charges against Edwin Meese, who served 
as attorney general under President Reagan from 1985 to 1988. Again, Walsh 
declined to prosecute Meese because of insufficient evidence, not because of 
any view that the attorney general’s prosecutorial discretion made him 
immune from obstruction liability.136 Walsh added in his final report that the 
criminal investigation of George H.W. Bush—who served as vice president 
under Reagan and then succeeded him as president—was “regrettably 
                                                
133 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
134 See Walter Pincus, Bush Pardons Weinberger in Iran-Contra Affair, WASHINGTON 
POST (Dec. 25 1992), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/28/AR2006032800858.html 
135 I LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR 
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ch. 27 (1993). 
136 Id. ch. 31. 
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incomplete.”137 
 The Iran-Contra affair differs from Watergate in an important respect: 
the obstruction allegations involved obstruction of congressional inquiries, 
and since the president does not have prosecutorial discretion with respect to 
congressional probes, the difficult questions concerning presidential 
obstruction that arise with respect to executive branch investigations did not 
come up in the Iran-Contra context. But most important for our purposes, the 
Watergate-era view that the president can commit obstruction does not appear 
to have been weakened. 
 
3. The Impeachment of Bill Clinton 
 
In December 1998, Bill Clinton became just the second president in 
American history to be impeached. One of the two articles of impeachment 
reported out of the House charged the president with obstruction of justice. 
The specific allegations in the House impeachment report were that Clinton 
encouraged former White House intern Monica Lewinsky and Oval Office 
secretary Betty Currie to give false testimony in a sexual harassment lawsuit 
against him, that he allowed his attorney to make false and misleading 
statements to a federal judge in the harassment suit, and that he lied to aides 
about his relationship with Lewinsky knowing that the aides would repeat 
those lies to a federal grand jury.138 
 The impeachment of President Clinton was controversial in many 
respects, and the Senate ultimately split 50-50 on the article of impeachment 
charging obstruction. Yet at no point during the impeachment proceedings 
was there debate as to whether presidential obstruction could be an 
impeachable offense or whether a president could be charged criminally for 
obstruction following removal. The House Judiciary Committee’s report said 
that the first article of impeachment against Nixon had established a “clear 
precedent” that a president who used his position of power to obstruct the 
administration of justice committed an impeachable offense.139 The Judiciary 
Committee report also concluded that Clinton’s obstruction of a pending 
federal judicial proceeding was a crime within the scope of section 1503.140 
Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee disputed the factual allegations 
against Clinton but did not dispute the majority’s claim that presidential 
obstruction is a potentially impeachable and criminal offense.141  
                                                
137 Id. ch. 28. 
138 IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 63–74 (1998). 
139 Id. at 119. 
140 See id. at 64, 120–21. 
141 See id. at 243–57 (minority views).  
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 The view that presidential obstruction is both impeachable and 
criminal emerges even more clearly from the Senate proceedings. The trial 
memorandum submitted by the House to the Senate argued that President 
Clinton’s conduct “might easily have been charged under [the obstruction] 
statutes.”142 President Clinton’s brief to the Senate also acknowledged section 
1503 as providing the “applicable law.”143 Senators from both parties, 
including supporters and opponents of Clinton’s removal, recognized in floor 
statements that section 1503 applied to the president (though they disagreed 
as to whether the president had violated the provision).144 A letter from more 
than 430 law professors opposing impeachment nonetheless agreed that 
“obstructing justice can without doubt be impeachable” as well as criminal.145 
The professors argued that “making false statements about sexual 
improprieties is not a sufficient constitutional basis to justify the trial and 
removal from office of the President of the United States,” but they 
emphasized that—by contrast—a “President who corruptly used the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to obstruct an investigation would have criminally 
exercised his presidential powers.”146  
 As in Iran-Contra, most of the presidential obstruction questions in 
the Clinton case did not involve the same questions of prosecutorial 
discretion that we discuss in section I.B. The allegations against Clinton 
centered around obstruction of the administration of justice in a civil 
proceeding initiated by a private citizen, rather than interference with an 
executive branch investigation. Insofar as Clinton obstructed a grand jury 
inquiry, it was the independent counsel—and not a prosecutor under the 
president’s control—who was spearheading the investigation. Nonetheless, 
we think it relevant that Clinton’s accusers and defenders both accepted the 
proposition that a president who uses his position of power to obstruct an 
investigation thereby commits an impeachable offense and a crime.  
 
                                                
142 S. Doc. 106-14, at 813 (1999) (Trial Mem. of the U.S. House). 
143 See id. at 961 (Trial Mem. of President Clinton).  
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Opposing Impeachment, JURIST (Nov. 6, 1998), 
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4. Dismissal of U.S. Attorneys Under George W. Bush 
 
The dismissal of nine U.S. attorneys by President George W. Bush in 
2006 provided the most recent occasion (prior to Trump’s tenure) for 
considering the interaction between prosecutorial discretion and criminal 
obstruction. The most controversial of these dismissals was that of David 
Iglesias as U.S. attorney in the District of New Mexico.147 According to a 
subsequent Justice Department report, several New Mexico Republicans had 
pressured Iglesias to investigate voter fraud allegations more aggressively 
and to bring an indictment against former Democratic state senator Manny 
Aragon prior to the November 2006 election. In December of that year, after 
Iglesias had failed to bring charges against the Democratic politician, a senior 
official in the Bush administration Justice Department asked Iglesias to 
resign. Iglesias stepped down later that month. The acting U.S. attorney who 
replaced Iglesias brought charges against Aragon in March of the following 
year.148 
 In September 2008, the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector 
General and Office of Professional Responsibility released a report on the 
firing of Iglesias and the eight other U.S. attorneys. The report recommended 
the appointment of a special counsel to investigate the Iglesias firing more 
fully.149 The report went on to say: 
 
While we found no case charging a violation of the obstruction of 
justice statute involving an effort to accelerate a criminal prosecution 
for partisan political purposes, we believe that pressuring a prosecutor 
to indict a case more quickly to affect the outcome of an upcoming 
election could be a corrupt attempt to influence the prosecution in 
violation of the obstruction of justice statute. The same reasoning 
could apply to pressuring a prosecutor to take partisan political 
considerations into account in his charging decisions in voter fraud 
matters.150 
 
 Then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed a federal 
prosecutor from Connecticut to conduct an investigation into Iglesias’s firing. 
The special prosecutor’s investigation ended in 2010 without any criminal 
charges being filed. A letter from the Justice Department to the chairman of 
                                                
147 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL & OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
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the House Judiciary Committee relayed the special prosecutor’s conclusion 
that the evidence was “insufficient to establish an attempt to pressure Mr. 
Iglesias to accelerate his charging decisions.”151 
 The Iglesias episode is likely to go down in history as a footnote. But 
even as a footnote, it supports an important proposition: at least in the view 
of the Justice Department, public officials can commit the crime of 
obstruction not just by thwarting an investigation for political reasons but by 
propelling an investigation forward for political ends.152   
 
D.  Synthesizing the Obstruction Statutes and Article II 
 
The primary challenge in applying the obstruction statutes to the president 
comes in defining the mens rea of “corruptly” in a manner that respects the 
president’s role as the head of the executive branch. Recall that Congress and 
the courts have construed “corruptly” to refer to “improper purpose.” The 
president does not act corruptly when his actions follow from a good-faith 
effort to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. For example, if the president 
interferes with an investigation because he thinks it might reveal the identity 
of an undercover intelligence operative abroad, or because he worries it might 
bring us to the brink of war with a hostile nation, his actions follow from an 
appropriate conception of his commander-in-chief responsibilities and so 
cannot constitute obstruction. So too, when the president intervenes because 
he believes that an investigation amounts to a waste of scarce enforcement 
resources, his actions follow from his responsibilities under the take care 
clause and are likewise noncriminal.153 
 This is not to suggest that the president must justify each exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by drawing a link back to a particular provision of 
Article II. As the Supreme Court noted in the 1996 case of United States v. 
Armstrong: 
 
                                                
151 Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of 
Legislative Affairs, to Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 
House of Representatives (July 21, 2010), 
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152 It might seem odd to say that advancing an investigation could be an obstruction of 
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153 Cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(Bork, J.) (“The power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core 
of the Executive's duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws.”). 
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The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad 
discretion to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws. They have this latitude 
because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to help 
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.” As a result, the presumption of regularity supports 
their prosecutorial decisions and, in the absence of clear evidence to the 
contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official 
duties.154  
 
 If the presumption of regularity attaches to the prosecutorial decisions 
of the attorney general and the U.S. attorneys because they are the president’s 
delegates, then that presumption applies to the prosecutorial decisions of the 
president as well. But the presumption of regularity is not irrebuttable: it may 
be overcome, for example, by showing that the official actions were “in 
violation of prescribed procedures.”155 That is, one begins from the premise 
that the president intervened in the investigation to carry out his Article II 
responsibilities, and one usually ends there—but not always. 
 When might a president’s intervention in an investigation or other 
proceeding overcome the presumption of regularity? The Justice 
Department’s regulations for prosecutors provide a starting point for thinking 
about this problem. They forbid a prosecutor to take part in an investigation 
where she has a “personal or political relationship” with the subject or 
someone connected with the investigation.156 Political relationship means “a 
close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether or not 
successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign 
organization.”157 Personal relationship “means a close and substantial 
connection of the type normally viewed as likely to induce partiality.”158 A 
prosecutor is “presumed to have a personal relationship with his father, 
mother, brother, sister, child and spouse.”159 Involvement in such 
investigations is improper because the prosecutor will be tempted to interfere 
with the normal course of law enforcement.160 These regulations operate 
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against the backdrop of a federal conflict-of-interest statute that imposes 
criminal penalties161 upon federal officers and employees who “participate[] 
personally” in matters in which they, their spouses, or their minor children 
have a “financial interest.”162 
 The president differs from a prosecutor in several ways. First, he has 
a political relationship with far more people, including almost every major 
official in the executive branch and every important member of his party. 
This suggests a worry: if the obstruction statutes are applied to the president, 
he must recuse himself from countless investigations where there may be a 
valid public reason to intervene. Second, however, the president is almost 
never directly involved in an investigation. Because of the nature of his 
position, he does not have the time or inclination; typically, he takes part in 
law enforcement by setting priorities and making appointments.163 While he 
needs to have the freedom to set the priorities, he can also often recuse 
himself from individual investigations without sacrificing too much 
executive authority. Third, the president, unlike a prosecutor, is responsible 
for national security, public order, and other important areas of national life, 
and plays a significant role in setting public policy. He therefore needs 
flexibility to block investigations that interfere with the broad public interest. 
 Thus, while an argument could be made that the president obstructs 
justice whenever he interferes with an investigation in a way that is not 
consistent with his constitutional and legal role, this seems to us too broad 
because the outer limits of the president’s authority are ambiguous and 
subject to disagreement. A more sensible approach would apply the 
obstruction statutes narrowly to cases where there is no serious claim that the 
president’s motive is consistent with his public role. The presumption of 
regularity would apply except when the president seeks to advance interests 
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that are narrowly personal (e.g., in the well-being of family members), 
pecuniary (e.g., in the procurement of a bribe), or partisan (e.g., in winning 
the next election or in aiding the electoral prospects of a party member). 
 This conclusion is informed not only by the ethical and legal 
guidelines applicable to prosecutors, but also by structural inferences drawn 
from the Constitution. The founders acknowledged the impropriety of a 
public official participating in a proceeding in which he has a personal stake: 
hence the rule that the chief justice, rather than the vice president, presides 
over the Senate trial of an impeached president.164 The vice president—who 
normally presides over the Senate165—would have an obvious personal stake 
in the president’s trial because the vice president is next in the order of 
succession. The founders also included a number of constitutional provisions 
designed to combat financial conflicts of interest, including the Ineligibility 
Clause166 and the Foreign167 and Domestic Emoluments Clauses.168 And 
while the Constitution does not specifically regulate the use of public office 
for partisan purposes, that is probably because the founders envisioned a 
Republic without parties. Believing parties to be a “political evil,”169 they 
certainly would have thought it improper for the president to use his position 
of power in pursuit of narrowly partisan ends. 
 Translating these structural inferences into a legal standard for 
presidential obstruction of justice is not an entirely straightforward exercise. 
But this is precisely the exercise that a court would have to undertake in the 
event that a president (or former president) is prosecuted on charges that he 
committed obstruction while in office. We suggest that the following 
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standard best synthesizes the legal materials we have examined: A president 
commits obstruction of justice when he significantly interferes with an 
investigation, prosecution, or other law enforcement action to advance 
narrowly personal, pecuniary, or partisan interests. He does not, however, 
commit obstruction when he acts on the basis of a legitimate and good-faith 
conception of his constitutional responsibilities, even if he receives a personal 
or pecuniary benefit or incidentally advances his party’s interests.  
 We address questions of mixed motives at greater length in section 
II.A. For now, let us define some of the terms. “Significant interference” 
means a direct order to a responsible subordinate (like an FBI agent or Justice 
Department lawyer) to drop an investigation, prosecution, or other law 
enforcement activity, or ensure that it is not completed to professional 
standards. Significant interference could also take place less directly—for 
example, by conveying the order through intermediaries. And significant 
interference need not be limited to thwarting an investigation: a president 
might interfere with an investigation, we suppose, by ordering a subordinate 
to bring an indictment against a political opponent on the eve of an election 
when the facts do not support those charges, as was suggested (but not 
proven) in the Iglesias case.  
We would define “personal,” “pecuniary,” and “partisan” interests 
narrowly. The president would be guilty of obstruction if he significantly 
interferes with an investigation because he believes that it will likely bring to 
light evidence of criminal activity or other wrongful or embarrassing conduct 
by himself, his family members, or his top aides. This would not require proof 
of any underlying offense or misdeed. As we have emphasized above, one 
can obstruct an investigation that is headed toward a dead end.170 At the same 
time, a president who interferes with an investigation because he knows there 
is no fire underneath the smoke might justify his intervention on the grounds 
that the probe was a waste of law enforcement resources.  
Family members, in our view, should include first-degree blood 
relations, as is the case under the Justice Department’s recusal rules for 
federal prosecutors.171 Of course, applications will vary case by case. 
Interfering with an investigation in order to protect a son-in-law with whom 
the president is particularly close might constitute obstruction. The Justice 
Department’s recusal regulation is again instructive: it prescribes that 
“[w]hether relationships (including friendships) . . . are ‘personal’ must be 
judged on an individual basis,” with “due regard” for the subjective opinion 
of the prosecutor whose objectivity is under challenge.172  
Our standard would apply both where the family member or aide is 
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171 See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(2). 
172 See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(2). 
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the subject of the investigation, and where the family member or aide is not 
the subject of the investigation but could be embarrassed by the outcome of 
the investigation even if he or she never engaged in criminal activity. For 
example, the president would violate the obstruction statutes by blocking an 
investigation because he thinks it might bring to light negative information 
about a top aide, a family member, or the president himself. He would 
likewise commit obstruction if he blocked an investigation of a top aide based 
on personal friendship toward that individual. A more difficult question is 
presented if the president interferes in an investigation because he believes 
that the target of the probe has served the nation admirably and is worthy of 
mercy. The use of the pardon power under these circumstances would be 
proper. As discussed below, however, we do not think that the existence of 
the pardon power justifies the surreptitious obstruction of an ongoing 
inquiry.173 
For cases in which the president orders a subordinate to bring baseless 
charges against a target, we would likewise define the scope of the 
obstruction statutes conservatively. Circumstances that might qualify would 
include a president directing a prosecutor to bring unfounded charges against 
a political opponent in the run-up to an election, or against an estranged 
spouse in order to gain an upper hand in a divorce dispute. Again, the court 
(or the jury) would need to be convinced that the president’s intervention was 
motivated by personal or partisan interests—and not by a good-faith if 
controversial view of what the public interest required. 
As for circumstances in which the president’s intervention might 
amount to obstruction because it was motivated by pecuniary interests, our 
analysis is informed by case law construing the federal bribery and extortion 
statutes.174 Under those provisions, a president commits a crime if he 
intervenes in an investigation as part of a quid-pro-quo exchange for a 
contribution to his reelection campaign,175 or—as we discuss below176—a 
donation to his presidential library. Because obstruction for pecuniary 
purposes overlaps with conduct already criminalized by other statutes, our 
focus here is on circumstances in which the president acts for personal or 
partisan rather than pecuniary reasons, and so would not be liable under the 
bribery and extortion laws.  
The most difficult questions arise when the president is accused of 
obstructing justice for partisan ends. The president is the leader of his party 
as well as the leader of the country, and it is accepted that he can use the 
powers of his office to advance his party’s interests as well as his own 
                                                
173 See infra Section III.B. 
174 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (bribery); § 872 (extortion); § 1951 (Hobbs Act). 
175 See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1991). 
176 See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying text. 
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political interest in being reelected or succeeded in office by a chosen 
successor. The distinction we seek to make is between actions that are 
consistent with the ideal of political competition and those that are not. The 
former include actions that benefit the president or his party politically 
because they advance a policy agenda of which the public approves. The 
latter include actions that benefit the president or his party by making it 
difficult for political opponents to make their case to the public. 
To understand this distinction, consider three scenarios: (1) a 
president orders the Justice Department to stop prosecuting cases involving 
possession and distribution of marijuana because he considers such efforts to 
be a poor use of scarce enforcement resources; (2) a president orders the 
Justice Department to stop prosecuting cases involving the possession and 
distribution of marijuana because he believes a “soft on pot” policy will draw 
younger voters to his party; and (3) a president orders the Justice Department 
to drop a case involving possession and distribution of marijuana by a senator 
from his own party who stands for reelection the next month.  
In the first scenario, the president would not be guilty of obstruction. 
As we have argued above, the president’s obligation to “take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed” means that in certain circumstances he must 
prioritize the enforcement of some laws over others, based on policy 
considerations. Moreover, the president’s power over enforcement serves as 
a check against congressional overcriminalization. Thus the president also 
might, in some cases, choose to drop enforcement actions against people who 
violated a sedition law, who evaded the draft, who have entered the country 
illegally, and who have failed to pay their taxes. Constraints on these types 
of non-enforcement, if any, would come from the constitutional norms 
discussed above. 
The third scenario is also straightforward: the president acts 
improperly—and thus corruptly—when he uses prosecutorial power to harass 
his political enemies while sparing his friends. Of course, if the president 
adopted a broad policy of prosecutorial forbearance in marijuana possession 
and distribution cases, then applying that broad policy to a partisan ally would 
not amount to obstruction. What the president cannot do is to abuse his 
position of power to distort electoral outcomes by enforcing generally 
applicable laws only against political enemies. 
The second scenario is closer. Let us assume that the president writes 
a memo clearly stating that his only reason for adopting the “soft on pot” 
policy is to win votes—he thinks it is otherwise a bad policy. Imagine that he 
also observes that the policy would throw the opposing party into turmoil, 
destroying its electoral prospects for years to come. Isn’t his motive 
“narrowly partisan”? We think that the president’s motive is legitimate. One 
can argue (though not all would agree) that presidents should adopt policies 
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that the public broadly supports, as long as these policies do not exceed 
constitutional limits.177 What the president cannot do is single out targets of 
law enforcement for harassment or immunity based on their partisan leanings. 
This type of partisan or political discrimination undermines political 
competition by forcing the party out of power to devote resources to fend off 
prosecutions and other enforcement actions based on behavior that is no 
different from that of the president’s supporters—or, potentially, coerces 
opponents into silence so that they can avoid the president’s wrath. 
Our standard also does not result in criminal liability for the president 
if the president blocks an investigation or prosecution that would have 
personally embarrassed or harmed a prior president of the opposite party. For 
example, President Obama’s decision not to prosecute former Bush 
administration officials for torture178 does not count as obstruction of justice. 
Obama’s motive was, apparently, to avoid criminalizing political 
differences—an important norm in democratic politics. But what if his real 
motive was to avoid partisan attacks that might have jeopardized his 
legislative priorities and threatened his presidency? The decision not to 
prosecute begins to seem partisan rather than public-spirited. While this case 
is nearer to the line, we think that the obstruction statutes would not apply. 
Here, the president’s concern about partisan polarization is close enough to a 
legitimate conception of the public interest that applying the obstruction 
statutes in such a case would threaten his ability to do what he thinks is best 
for the nation.   
Intervening in an investigation to ensure the success of a diplomatic 
endeavor would also not constitute obstruction according to our standard. 
Suppose, for example, that the FBI is investigating someone for his possibly 
illegal financial ties to Russia, and it turns out that the president has also 
retained this person as an envoy to conduct sensitive back-channel 
negotiations. The president would be permitted to order the FBI to drop the 
case; such an action would be consistent with the president’s role as 
commander-in-chief and the “organ of the nation in its external relations.”179 
By contrast, suppose the person is not an envoy, but merely a friend or aide, 
and the president believes that if the investigation came to light, he would not 
be able to obtain the votes for a health care reform bill. Here, the national 
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security defense would not hold. Nor could the president legitimately defend 
himself on the ground that the health care reform bill was a worthy piece of 
legislation. Manipulating the conduct of criminal investigations in order to 
sway the outcome of congressional votes is flatly inconsistent with the norms 
of political competition and persuasion that undergird a constitutional 
democracy. 
 Our standard does not result in criminal liability for the president if 
the president personally benefits from decisions by lower-level officials, like 
the attorney general and the FBI director, not to prosecute or investigate 
cases. In the absence of an actus reus, there can be no liability. Note that the 
attorney general and the FBI director also cannot be liable merely for failing 
to bring a case unless some positive act can be identified—possibly, for 
example, ordering an end to a probe begun by a subordinate official, or 
destroying documents that might have assisted another investigator (such as 
Congress) with an inquiry into the same matter. Imagine, for example, that 
the FBI director refuses to investigate plausible claims that a family member 
of the president committed a crime. While an argument can be made that 
officials should be liable for omissions—for failures to comply with a 
positive official duty—we think that such a rule would interfere excessively 
with prosecutorial and enforcement discretion. 
 By contrast, Nixon clearly engaged in obstruction of justice because 
he interfered with investigations and proceedings that would have put him in 
legal jeopardy and generated embarrassing information—without any reason 
grounded in public policy or his constitutional responsibilities for doing so. 
The Clinton case is also straightforward. Since he interfered with a civil 
action and a grand jury investigation in order to protect himself from 
embarrassment, he obstructed justice. The firing of U.S. Attorney David 
Iglesias is on the line. If the facts are taken in their worst light, Bush or his 
top aides sought to speed up the prosecution of a Democratic politician for 
partisan reasons. However, merely firing U.S. attorneys because they are not 
loyal to the administration or likely to serve its priorities is not obstruction. 
The charge that President Reagan committed obstruction in the Iran-Contra 
affair seems to lack an actus reus. If the president had sought to hide evidence 
from congressional investigators regarding U.S. dealings with the Iranians or 
the Contra rebels, that would raise difficult questions about the line between 
the president’s commander-in-chief role and Congress’s foreign affairs 
powers. 
 Let us consider some examples taken, in abstract form because of 
ambiguities about the evidence at the time of this writing, from the recent 
turmoil in the Trump administration. A retired general who advised the 
president during a recently concluded campaign is accused of violating a 
provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act by failing to disclose certain 
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payments he received from a foreign government. Violations of this provision 
have been prosecuted in the past but very rarely lead to prison sentences. The 
president believes that the retired general technically violated the law but that 
the violation was an oversight that resulted from the retired general’s lack of 
familiarity with the relevant provision. The president believes that—in light 
of the retired general’s decades of decorated service to the nation—the 
investigation is unfair and should end. The president orders an end to the 
investigation and threatens to fire the prosecutor pursuing the probe unless 
the case is dropped. This might be a case in which preemptively pardoning 
the retired general would be justifiable on grounds of mercy. (We discuss the 
pardon power at greater length in Section II.C.) But given the close political 
relationship between the president and the retired general, the presumption of 
regularity would not apply. It is, moreover, hard to see how the president’s 
intervention can be justified on grounds of national security, or faithful 
execution, or the public good more generally. Under these circumstances, we 
think the president’s purpose would be improper, and so his interference 
would amount to obstruction of justice. 
 Imagine, now, that the president’s son is accused of violating a 
provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act by accepting an in-kind 
contribution from a foreign government. There is no recorded case of any 
other individual being prosecuted successfully for accepting such an in-kind 
contribution. Legal scholars are divided as to whether the statute applies to 
the son’s conduct. A federal prosecutor begins an investigation targeting the 
son, and the president believes that the investigation is motivated by the 
prosecutor’s own political inclinations. The president orders an end to the 
investigation and threatens to fire the prosecutor unless the case is dropped. 
This case is closer. The president has a responsibility to ensure that lower-
level prosecutors do not misuse their power for political ends. On the other 
hand, the president is by no means a disinterested party here. He should 
recuse himself and allow, say, a high-ranking official at the Justice 
Department with a reputation for fair-mindedness to make the call. But we 
think that a court or a jury would likely—and appropriately—consider the 
president’s purpose to be improper because of his personal stake in the case 
and the very loose link to the public interest. 
 What if instead the president intervenes in an investigation because 
he knows that it will reveal foreign interference in the last election and so will 
undermine respect for the outcome? The president might argue that popular 
confidence in presidential election results is an overriding national interest. 
Here, too, we think his defense should fail. It is difficult to accept the 
argument that a proper conception of the public interest entails hiding the fact 
of foreign infiltration in the American electoral process. Again, the case 
comes down to mens rea and to a judgment, informed by constitutional and 
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prudential considerations, as to whether the president’s purpose for 
intervening in the investigation can possibly be characterized as proper. 
 In sum, historical examples and imaginative exercises generate easy 
cases as well as hard ones. The president who intervenes in an investigation 
to cover up sexual misconduct commits obstruction. The president who 
intervenes in order to hide the fact of sensitive back-channel communications 
that might bring peace to the Middle East does not violate the obstruction 
laws. No doubt the future will bring us new data points against which to test 
our suggested standard. Our purpose is not to resolve all questions but to 
provide courts with a starting point from which to work.  
 
II.  COMPLICATIONS 
 
A.  Mixed Motives 
 
Our analysis in section I.D assumed a president acting on the basis of a 
single motive. The analysis becomes more complicated when the president’s 
motives are multiple. Imagine that the president intervenes in an investigation 
both because he fears that it will bring to light information that might stymie 
a critically important diplomatic effort and because he fears it will reveal 
evidence that a foreign power meddled in the last election to bolster his own 
bid. How should a court—or how should Congress in the impeachment 
context—weigh the former (legitimate) purpose against the latter (improper) 
one? 
Courts that have confronted the mixed motives problem in the context 
of nonpresidential obstruction have generally concluded that the mens rea 
requirement is satisfied “if the offending action was prompted, at least in part, 
by a ‘corrupt’ motive.”180 As one court of appeals has held, “A defendant’s 
unlawful purpose to obstruct justice is not negated by the simultaneous 
presence of another motive for his overall conduct.”181 A recent case of mixed 
motives serves to illustrate. A Philadelphia police officer was assigned to 
assist in a raid targeting a cocaine kingpin whose girlfriend was the sister of 
                                                
180 United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978); accord United 
States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460, 1465 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[O]ffending conduct must be 
prompted, at least in part, by a corrupt motive.” (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also 
United States v. Burke, 125 F.3d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“[D]efendant’s 
“‘altruistic’ motive . . . does not make it any less an obstruction” for purposes of sentencing 
enhancement); United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggesting but not 
holding that “evidence of a bad motive or purpose . . . is sufficient to sustain a conviction 
even though a good motive is also present”); State v. Maughan, 305 P.3d 1058, 1062 (Utah 
2013) (“[E]ven a mixed motive would still encompass a finding of specific intent to obstruct” 
for purposes of state obstruction of justice statute). 
181 United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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a childhood friend. The officer called the friend so that the friend could alert 
his sister of the impending raid. The officer was later charged with and 
convicted of obstruction of justice in violation of section 1505.182 The Third 
Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that “[e]ven if [the officer]’s primary 
motivation was to extricate the sister of his childhood friend from a troubled 
situation, he still could have intended to obstruct the [drug] investigation to 
accomplish this goal.”183 
 Applying these mixed motives precedents by rote to the president 
would suggest that any improper purpose is enough to convict the president 
of obstruction. Yet such a rule would be unwise. Presidents often act for a 
mix of personal, partisan, and public-spirited reasons. Even when the 
president believes he is acting for the good of the nation, he might also have 
in mind the thought that his actions will raise his approval rating and thus 
improve his party’s prospects in the next election. While we think that the 
president who obstructs an investigation solely for partisan advantage 
commits the crime of obstruction, it would be absurd to say that the president 
commits the crime of obstruction whenever he exercises prosecutorial 
discretion with partisan politics in the back of his mind. 
 We suggest that a “but-for motive” rule makes more sense in the 
presidential obstruction context.184 If the president would have taken the 
challenged action for national security reasons or in executing his 
responsibility to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, then that fact 
should immunize him from obstruction liability. The application of the 
obstruction statutes to the president should not prevent him from carrying out 
his constitutional role. However, if the president would not have taken the 
challenged action in the exercise of his constitutional functions, then he 
should not be able to claim an Article II immunity from obstruction liability. 
In that case, he should be treated like any other defendant, for whom a corrupt 
motive is enough for criminal liability even if that corrupt motive is not the 
exclusive rationale for action.  
 
B.  Implications of the Pardon Power 
 
So far, we have mentioned only in passing the president’s pardon power, 
which further complicates the analysis of presidential obstruction. Article II, 
section 2, clause 1 gives the president “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”185 
                                                
182 United States v. Durham, 432 F. App’x 88, 89 (3d Cir. 2011). 
183 Id. at 92 n.7. 
184 For a discussion, see Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 27). 
185 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
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The exception for cases of impeachment certainly means, at the least, that the 
president cannot save an official from impeachment by pardoning him. It 
might also mean that the president cannot pardon someone who has been 
impeached and convicted so as to save the ousted officeholder from criminal 
consequences.186 With this one exception, the president’s pardon power is 
plenary. As the Supreme Court said in the 1866 case Ex parte Garland, the 
pardon power “extends to every offence known to the law, and may be 
exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings 
are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.” 
Moreover, the president’s pardon power “cannot be fettered by any 
legislative restrictions.”187 
 The existence of the pardon power raises two questions about 
presidential obstruction. The first is whether the president’s exercise of the 
pardon power can ever itself constitute obstruction of justice. The second is 
whether the president’s “greater” power to pardon gives him the “lesser” 
power to obstruct an investigation, as Professor Alan Dershowitz has 
argued.188 
 As for the first question, the relevant legal materials do not produce a 
clear answer. The Supreme Court suggested in the 1925 case Ex parte 
Grossman that misuse of the pardon power might be an impeachable 
                                                
186 The best evidence for the latter view comes from a speech by future Supreme Court 
Justice James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention. According to Iredell: 
 
After trial [in the Senate] thus solemnly conducted, it is not probable that it 
would happen once in a thousand times, that a man actually convicted would be 
entitled to mercy; and if the President had the power of pardoning in such a case, 
this great check upon high officers of state would lose much of its influence. It 
seems, therefore, proper that the general power of pardoning should be abridged in 
this particular instance. The punishment annexed to this conviction on impeachment 
can only be removal from office, and disqualification to hold any place of honor, 
trust, or profit. But the person convicted is further liable to a trial at common law, 
and may receive such common-law punishment as belongs to a description of such 
offences, if it be punishable by that law. 
 
3 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 107 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1830) (statement of 
James Iredell). 
187 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).  
188 Alan Dershowitz, History, Precedent, and James Comey’s Opening Statement Show 
That Trump Did Not Obstruct Justice, WASH. EXAMINER (June 8, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alan-dershowitz-history-precedent-and-james-
comeys-opening-statement-show-that-trump-did-not-obstruct-justice/article/2625318 (“The 
president can, as a matter of constitutional law, direct the attorney general, and his 
subordinate, the director of the FBI, tell them what to do, whom to prosecute and whom not 
to prosecute. Indeed, the president has the constitutional authority to stop the investigation 
of any person by simply pardoning that person.”). 
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offense.189 Alexander Hamilton said nearly 140 years earlier that a president 
who uses the pardon power to shield associates from prosecution for treason 
could be impeached and removed from office.190 At the state level, Oklahoma 
Governor J. C. Walton was impeached and convicted in 1923 for selling 
pardons.191 Governor Ray Blanton of Tennessee was forced to leave office 
early in 1979 amid similar allegations of pardon-selling in his 
administration.192  
 But to say that abuse of the pardon power is an impeachable offense 
is not the same as to say it is criminal. Indeed, one could say the opposite: 
                                                
189 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 106–08 (1925). Grossman involved a Chicago 
bootlegger who was convicted of contempt of court but pardoned by President Coolidge. The 
district judge ordered the defendant’s imprisonment notwithstanding the president’s pardon, 
reasoning that the pardon power did not extend to contempt charges. The Supreme Court 
rejected that argument. In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Taft wrote: 
 
If it be said that the President, by successive pardons of constantly recurring 
contempts in particular litigation, might deprive a court of power to enforce its 
orders in a recalcitrant neighborhood, it is enough to observe that such a course is 
so improbable as to furnish but little basis for argument. Exceptional cases like this, 
if to be imagined at all, would suggest a resort to impeachment rather than to a 
narrow and strained construction of the general powers of the President. 
 
Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
190 Hamilton writes: 
 
A President . . . , though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the 
ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of 
impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all 
the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an 
enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from 
death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to 
arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when 
the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption 
might himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be 
incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity?  
 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 
Jeffrey Crouch, Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. 722, 723 (2008) 
(noting that the expansiveness of the pardon power “was a general concern of the Anti-
Federalists,” and that “Hamilton attempted to quell those concerns” in FEDERALIST NO. 69 
by arguing that “despite the wide reach of the pardon power . . . the president would always 
be subject to impeachment if he ever acted improperly, even if he pardoned treasonous 
allies”).  
191 John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35 
POLITY 389, 392 (2003).  
192 See Ex-Tenn. Gov. Ray Blanton Dies, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 1996), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1996/11/23/ex-tenn-gov-ray-blanton-
dies/3988bcc3-6671-41a8-8e9f-51b5954dca05/?utm_term=.922c0c6d5fea. 
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that impeachment alone provides the remedy for abuse of the pardon power 
because of worries that criminalization would interfere with legitimate uses 
of executive power. In Grossman itself, the Supreme Court declined an 
opportunity to make an exception to the pardon power for criminal contempt 
of court because of the worry that such an exception would interfere with the 
president’s executive discretion. This view is bolstered by a tradition of 
understanding the pardon power in the broadest possible terms, enabling 
presidents not only to pardon people who are unjustly convicted of breaking 
the law, or who deserve mercy because of extenuating circumstances. 
Numerous presidents have pardoned people for broad public policy purposes 
and even for reasons of narrow political expediency, to reward political 
supporters and allies.193 If these types of pardons should be regarded as 
constitutionally proper, then “abuse” of the pardon power shrinks down to a 
very small subset. 
Controversial pardons by recent presidents provide us with case 
studies. President Ford, who pardoned his predecessor Richard Nixon one 
month after taking office, justified his decision on the grounds that “the 
tranquility to which this nation has been restored by [Nixon’s resignation] 
could be irreparably lost by the prospects of bringing to trial a former 
President,” adding that Nixon had “already paid the unprecedented penalty 
of relinquishing the highest elective office of the United States.”194 Taking 
Ford’s words at face value, the pardon of Nixon was motivated by the proper 
purposes of promoting the public welfare and granting mercy to a man who 
had already suffered severe punishment. While at the time there were calls 
for Ford’s impeachment,195 history has judged Ford more kindly.196 
History’s judgment has been less generous to President George H.W. 
Bush’s decision to pardon former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and 
several other Reagan administration officials for their role in the Iran-Contra 
affair.197 When he granted those pardons on Christmas Eve 1992, less than a 
                                                
193 See Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon and Amnesty: 
Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1225 (2003) (discussing abuse of the pardon and possible legislative responses). 
194 Proclamation 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974)  
195 See YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, GERALD FORD AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1970S, at 
30-31 (2005). 
196 See, e.g., Award Announcement: President Ford Receives John F. Kennedy Profile 
in Courage Award, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM (May 21, 2001), 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Events-and-Awards/Profile-in-Courage-Award/Award-
Recipients/Gerald-Ford-2001.aspx (honoring Ford with the Profile in Courage Award for 
making the “controversial decision of conscience to pardon former president Nixon and end 
the national trauma of Watergate”). 
197 See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 190, at 730 (“The Iran-Contra pardons may represent 
the start of a new trend whereby presidents pardon not for traditional reasons of mercy or the 
public interest, but to protect their own personal interests.”). 
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month before he left office, Bush appealed to considerations of mercy. 
Weinberger was, according to Bush, “a true American patriot” who had 
“rendered long and extraordinary service to our country” over the course of 
several decades, and who was now suffering from a “debilitating” illness 
while also caring for his cancer-stricken wife.198 Bush’s suggestion that his 
pardons to Weinberger and others were intended to prevent “the 
criminalization of policy differences” carried somewhat less force: the 
independent counsel who doggedly pursued the Iran-Contra investigation 
was a lifelong Republican and an early supporter of Ronald Reagan.199 There 
was widespread speculation at the time that the true motive for the pardons 
was to stall the independent counsel’s probe into Bush’s own wrongdoing—
and in particular, to prevent the independent counsel from reviewing a diary 
kept by Bush that had recently surfaced.200 Roughly half of respondents in a 
late 1992 Gallup poll said they thought Bush granted the pardons “to protect 
himself from legal difficulties or embarrassment resulting from his own role 
in Iran-Contra.”201  
The only president who has been investigated for possible criminal 
charges arising out of a pardon decision is Bill Clinton (or, at least, his is the 
only case in which such an investigation has subsequently come to light). On 
his last day in office in January 2001, President Clinton pardoned the fugitive 
financier Marc Rich, after Rich’s former wife had donated $450,000 to 
Clinton’s presidential library.202 The FBI and the U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York later opened an inquiry into possible bribery, 
obstruction, money laundering, and related charges against Clinton,203 and a 
federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York considered possible 
charges as well. The investigation lasted more than two years but did not 
result in an indictment.204 
                                                
198 Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992).  
199 See Neil A. Lewis, Lawrence E. Walsh, Prosecutor in Iran-Contra Scandal, Dies at 
102, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014), 
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200 See David Johnston, Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinberger Trial; 
Prosecutor Assails ‘Cover-Up,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1224.html. 
201 Crouch, supra note 190, at 730. 
202 See James V. Grimaldi, Denise Rich Gave Clinton Library $450,000, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 10, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2001/02/10/denise-rich-
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203 See Josh Gerstein, Comey ‘Enthusiastic’ About Bill Clinton Probe in 2001, FBI 
Memo Says, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/james-
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204 See FBI Records: The Vault: William J. Clinton Foundation, FED. BUREAU OF 
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In an op-ed published a month after the pardon, Clinton gave several 
justifications for his decision, including that other financiers who engaged in 
similar transactions had faced only civil penalties, and that two well-
respected tax experts had defended Rich’s reporting position.205 Clinton also 
noted that “many present and former high-ranking Israeli officials of both 
major political parties and leaders of Jewish communities in America and 
Europe urged the pardon of Mr. Rich because of his contributions and 
services to Israeli charitable causes, to the Mossad’s efforts to rescue and 
evacuate Jews from hostile countries, and to the peace process through 
sponsorship of education and health programs in Gaza and the West Bank.”206 
This foreign policy rationale might be characterized as a claim that “the 
public welfare will be better served” by the granting of the pardons,207 
which—if believed—would exonerate President Clinton of obstruction 
(though perhaps not of bribery). 
The investigation into Clinton suggests that, at least as of the early 
2000s, federal prosecutors and law enforcement officials were not convinced 
that the pardon power gave the president absolute immunity for any exercise 
of executive clemency. How might this view be squared with Ex parte 
Garland’s expansive description of the pardon power? One possible 
interpretation is that Congress cannot limit the effect of a pardon that has been 
granted, but that criminal law can still apply to the grantor. Indeed, we think 
that it is difficult to reject this interpretation unless one believes that a 
president who sells pardons is immune from criminal liability—and we know 
of no one who maintains that view.  
 Regardless of whether a president can commit the crime of 
obstruction by granting a pardon, that does not resolve the separate question 
of whether the president’s pardon power immunizes him from criminal 
liability for interfering in an investigation under other circumstances. 
Dershowitz argues that the greater power to pardon includes the lesser power 
to drop investigations. But while the greater power to pardon does bring some 
lesser powers with it (such as the power to commute a heavier sentence to a 
lighter one208 and the power to remit a fine209), Dershowitz’s claim that the 
                                                
INVESTIGATION, https://vault.fbi.gov/william-j.-clinton-foundation (last visited July 11, 
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205 William Jefferson Clinton, Op-Ed, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
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207 See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). 
208 See id. at 486–88 (holding that the president has the power to commute a sentence 
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209 See The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1885) (“[E]xcept in cases of impeachment and 
where fines are imposed by a co-ordinate department of the government for contempt of its 
authority, the President, under the general, unqualified grant of power to pardon offences 
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pardon power includes the power to block an investigation crumbles under 
scrutiny. 
 First, setting aside the issue of whether the president violates the law 
when he grants a pardon for an improper purpose, there remains substantial 
doubt as to whether the president has the power to self-pardon. And if the 
president lacks the “greater” power to self-pardon, then presumably he also 
lacks the “lesser” power to obstruct an investigation of which he is a target. 
The text of the Constitution does not answer the question of whether the 
president can self-pardon,210 and the structure of the Constitution arguably 
suggests that he cannot. As noted above, provisions in other articles and 
amendments appear to reflect a norm against self-dealing that is baked into 
the American system of government211—a norm that, if applied broadly, 
would call the validity of self-pardons into question. It was on this ground 
that the Office of Legal Counsel concluded in the run-up to Nixon’s 
resignation that a President cannot pardon himself.212 
Further evidence against the validity of self-pardons comes from the 
debate at the Constitutional Convention over the pardon clause. After 
Edmund Randolph raised a concern that the president could use the pardon 
power to shield himself from prosecution for treason, James Wilson 
responded: “If [the President] be himself a party to the guilt he can be 
impeached and prosecuted.”213 As Brian Kalt argues, this response suggests 
“an assumption by Wilson that self-pardons were invalid.”214 After all, if the 
president could self-pardon, then Wilson’s assurance that “he can be 
impeached and prosecuted” would have been empty. 
 The strongest argument against the claim that the president’s 
                                                
against the United States, may remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures of every description 
arising under the laws of Congress.”). 
210 As Brian Kalt notes, a pardon might be defined as “an ‘act of grace’ visited on an 
inferior by his superior,” which would suggest that a pardon necessarily involves a grantee 
who is separate from the grantor. BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A 
LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 44 (2012). But Kalt also acknowledges 
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211 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text; see also Brian C. Kalt, Note, 
Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 
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“greater” pardon power includes the power to self-pardon derives from the 
exception in cases of impeachment. If, as suggested above,215 this exception 
means that a pardon is ineffective both as a bar to impeachment and as a bar 
to criminal consequences after impeachment and removal, then the president 
does not have an unfettered power to protect himself from prosecution. To be 
sure, a self-pardon in the waning days of a presidential term might shield the 
outgoing president from criminal consequences as a practical matter. But 
until the possibility of impeachment is eliminated, the prospect that the 
president might be held criminally liable for offenses that are also 
impeachable remains at least technically on the table.  
 An alternative rebuttal to the “greater includes the lesser” argument 
posits that the power to publicly pardon a suspect is not greater than—but 
different from—the power to intervene covertly in an investigation. Professor 
Maxwell Stearns has made this point in response to Dershowitz: a pardon, 
according to Stearns, would be “out [in] the open, subject to media scrutiny 
and challenge,” and thus the president could be “held politically 
accountable.”216 This rebuttal rests on the assumption that pardons are 
necessarily public—an assumption that is not necessarily correct. Chief 
Justice Marshall said in the 1833 case United States v. Wilson that a pardon 
is a “private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the 
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially 
to the court.”217 Though Wilson itself did not involve a secret pardon, 
Marshall’s statement calls into question the claim that a pardon necessarily 
differs from obstruction in its publicity. 
 And yet still, the distinction between public-facing pardons and 
surreptitious obstruction might serve to undermine the “greater includes the 
lesser” argument here. The holding in United States v. Wilson is that for a 
pardon to negate an indictment, conviction, or sentence, the defendant must 
be pleaded in court.218 So even if a pardon can be granted in secret, it does 
little good for the grantee unless he brings it out into the public. The holding 
in Wilson and the constitutional requirement for public trials in criminal 
cases219 arguably ensure that pardons ultimately must be made public if they 
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are to have any effect at all. 
To sum up: It is possible that the president can avoid criminal liability 
for obstruction of justice by pardoning the target of an investigation rather 
than by ordering subordinates to drop the case. But it is simply not clear that 
this is the case. If, as we think, the president could be convicted of the crime 
of bribery if he pardoned someone in return for a bribe, then we cannot rule 
out the possibility that he could be convicted of obstruction of justice if he 
pardoned someone in order to block an investigation for reasons untethered 
to his constitutional and legal authority. But even if the president commits no 
obstruction of justice in the criminal sense by using the pardon power, it 
remains possible for him to commit the crime of obstruction of justice if he 
does not use the pardon power and instead orders subordinates to drop 
investigations or prosecutions.   
 
C.  Can the President Be Indicted While in Office? 
 
The entire question of presidential obstruction of justice might seem idle 
if the president cannot be convicted of a crime, as some commentators have 
claimed.220 However, there are several reasons why criminal liability can 
make a difference. First, the claim that a sitting president cannot be convicted 
of a crime while in office does not represent settled law. Second, even if a 
president cannot be convicted of a crime while in office, it may be possible 
to convict him after he leaves office of a crime he convicted while in office. 
Third, even if a president cannot be convicted of a crime committed while in 
office, he may be impeached for such a crime. Below, we briefly discuss each 
of these points. 
 The only authoritative legal analysis of the first claim comes from the 
executive branch itself. In 1973, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice 
Department issued an opinion that the president could not be indicted or 
prosecuted while in office.221 Later that year, the solicitor general argued to 
a court in connection with grand jury proceedings against Vice President 
Spiro Agnew that, while the vice president was subject to criminal process, 
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the president was not.222 In 2000, the OLC revisited the question, and 
concluded that its earlier opinion was correct.223 
 As the OLC acknowledges, there is no textual or historical basis for 
the claim that the president is immune to criminal process.224 The 
impeachment judgment clause says that a party who is impeached is also 
“liable and subject to” criminal process, implying that an impeached 
president could be convicted for the crime that led to impeachment. This was 
also the view expressed by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. No 
other textual or historical source suggests that the president is immune to 
criminal process.225 
In Clinton v. Jones, the Court rejected the argument that the president 
should be immune to civil process.226 The OLC accordingly rests its argument 
for immunity on general “structural principles,” claiming that criminal 
prosecution of the president would put an excessive burden on him and 
interfere with his constitutionally prescribed role. Several Supreme Court 
cases, decided after the 1973 opinion, are roughly consistent with this 
view.227 They acknowledge that because of the president’s unique role in the 
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constitutional scheme, criminal process cannot be applied to him in the same 
way that is applied to ordinary citizens and other public officials. However, 
these opinions suggest a case-by-case approach rather than blanket immunity. 
Courts should take account of the president’s role when deciding whether and 
how he should be subject to process. The OLC’s conclusion that the president 
should receive blanket immunity from criminal process does not follow.228 
To be sure, it is possible to believe that criminal process will interfere with 
the president’s duties, whereas civil process will not, but we doubt that such 
a broad generalization can be upheld. A judge can manage a criminal 
proceeding so that it puts as little burden on the president as a civil proceeding 
does, and can suspend any prison sentence until the end of the president’s 
term. 
 By contrast, there is no uncertainty as to whether a former president 
can be convicted of a crime committed while in office. The impeachment 
judgment clause explicitly recognizes that he can, and the OLC agrees.229 
There are good policy reasons for such a view. Post-tenure proceedings 
would not interfere with presidential duties, but the prospect of criminal 
liability may deter a president from breaking the law. This alone justifies our 
inquiry into whether the obstruction of justice statute applies to the president. 
 Finally, the question of criminal liability matters because of the role 
it may play in an impeachment. The impeachment clause says that the 
president and other public officials can be impeached for and convicted of 
“Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”230 There are 
different views about the meaning of this clause. The reference to “crimes” 
may imply that impeachment can occur only if the official has committed a 
crime.231 However, another possible view is that a president can be 
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impeached for purely “political” reasons—if he loses the confidence of 
Congress—even if the does not commit a crime.232 An intermediate view is 
that the president can be impeached only for crimes and for certain political 
acts that achieve a certain threshold of significance.233 
 Whatever the correct view, we think it important that in both the 
Nixon and Clinton cases, the drafters of the articles of impeachment took care 
to note that the president had committed a “crime” in some of the articles. In 
both cases, articles that did not cite a crime were later dropped.234 At a 
minimum, some members of Congress may not be willing to vote for 
impeachment or conviction unless a serious underlying crime can be 
identified. For that reason, it is important to determine whether a president 
can commit the crime of obstruction of justice. 
 
D.  Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
 
We have acknowledged that applying the obstruction statutes to the 
president poses difficult questions of a constitutional dimension. That, one 
might argue, is sufficient to trigger the canon of constitutional avoidance—
the principle that “courts should try to interpret statutes so as to avoid raising 
difficult questions of constitutional law.”235 If interpreting the obstruction 
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statutes so that they apply to the president raises difficult constitutional 
questions, that is reason enough to interpret the obstruction statutes so that 
they do not. 
 This argument gains support from the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision 
in Franklin v. Massachusetts.236 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued 
President George H.W. Bush and two other federal officials, claiming that 
the Bush administration had miscalculated Massachusetts’s population 
following the 1990 census in a way that reduced the state’s delegation to the 
U.S. House of Representatives by one. Massachusetts charged that the 
administration’s calculation violated the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),237 which provides that courts “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”238 The Supreme Court rejected 
Massachusetts’s argument, holding that the APA does not apply to the 
president. As Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority: 
 
The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but 
he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of 
powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that 
textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the 
APA. We would require an express statement by Congress before assuming 
it intended the President’s performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.239  
 
 Might the same logic apply to the obstruction laws? After all, the 
relevant statutes do not say explicitly that they reach the president. This 
argument may seem attractive insofar as it would allow a court to avoid—or, 
at least, delay—reconciling the obstruction statutes with the principle of 
presidential prosecutorial discretion. The court would in effect be saying that 
if Congress wants the obstruction statutes to apply to the president, it must 
say so explicitly. But we do not think that the argument can carry the day. 
First, the Supreme Court has said that the canon of constitutional avoidance 
“is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a 
provision,” and that the canon “has no application in the absence of 
ambiguity.”240 In Franklin, the relevant statute was arguably ambiguous: the 
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term “agency”—while defined expansively in the APA241—is not a word that 
one usually uses to describe a single individual such as the president. Here, 
by contrast, it is difficult to read “whoever” to mean anything other than 
whoever. Interpreting the word “whoever” to mean “whoever, except the 
president” does violence to the statutory language in a way that the canon of 
constitutional avoidance neither requires nor allows. 
 Second, the constitutional avoidance argument sketched out above 
comes into conflict with the holding in United States v. Nixon,242 in which 
the Supreme Court applied Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to a sitting president. That rule provides, in relevant part, that “[a] 
subpoena may . . . command the person to whom it is directed to produce the 
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein.”243 Rule 17(c) 
does not say that “a subpoena may command the person to whom it is 
directed, including the president,” to produce the designated documents or 
objects. Notwithstanding the absence of any explicit reference to the 
president, the Justices unanimously concluded that the district court acted 
“consistent with Rule 17(c)” when it denied President Nixon’s motion to 
quash a subpoena for Oval Office tape recordings.244 And while the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in United States v. Nixon did not mention the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, it is difficult to square that decision with the 
proposition that statutes do not apply to the president unless they specifically 
say so. 
 Third, and finally, every member of Congress who addressed the 
question of whether the obstruction laws apply to the president during the 
Nixon and Clinton impeachment proceedings concluded that they do.245 We 
are not aware of any other instance in which any lawmaker has expressed the 
contrary view. Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance would, at 
most, compel Congress to recodify the proposition that the president cannot 
interfere with the due administration of justice—a proposition that senators 
and representatives have accepted for decades without doubt. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While Trump’s recent firing of James Comey motivated this article, the 
question whether the president can obstruct justice as a constitutional matter 
is likely to stay with us for a long time. Trump is the ninth president since 
Nixon. Of these nine presidents, serious accusations of obstruction have been 
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leveled against six of them or their top aides—Nixon, Reagan, George H.W. 
Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and now Trump. We can be sure that this 
question will remain with us for some time to come. Yet as far as we know, 
before Nixon, exactly zero of the previous 36 presidents were placed in legal 
or political jeopardy because of an obstruction of justice allegation. Not even 
Andrew Johnson was accused of obstruction of justice, even though his 
failure to enforce Congress’ Reconstruction policies could have been 
described as just that, and even though the crime of obstruction had been 
defined by statute for more than three decades by that point. What accounts 
for this significant change in public attitudes? 
 We speculate that the answer lies in the concurrent expansion of 
presidential power and federal criminal and civil law. Presidents have vastly 
more resources at their disposal to advance their agendas than they did in the 
past, thanks to the rise in the funding and staffing of the executive branch. 
Congress has also delegated presidents immense power by passing broad and 
frequently vague laws that regulate many areas of life, including a great deal 
of political behavior (raising money, conducting campaigns) as well as 
generic laws relating to tax, business, and the like. Laws of both types can 
ensnare the president’s rivals. This means that presidents can strengthen their 
position in government through selective prosecution of their political 
opponents, along with selective non-prosecution of their aides and 
supporters. Under these circumstances, elections cannot exert much 
discipline on presidents, while the impeachment process is cumbersome at 
best. Courts can normally intervene only at the request of the executive 
branch, which is controlled by the president. Presidents seem unconstrained. 
 But it turns out that the presidents are vulnerable to an institution that 
was not foreseen by the founders as a check on presidential power: the 
immense and prestigious legal and investigative bureaucracy. Both as a 
practical matter and as a product of post-Watergate concerns about 
presidential abuse, these powerful agencies enjoy considerable political 
autonomy from the president. These institutions can and do, on their own, 
bring investigations when the president’s abuse of power implicates the law, 
or entangles the president’s aides in legal wrongdoing. When they do, the 
president is put to the choice whether to try to block the investigation or 
permit it. The agencies appear to enjoy enough trust among the public that if 
the president blocks an investigation, he will pay a political price. 
 All of this suggests that the 186 year-old obstruction of justice law 
has, in the decades since Watergate, evolved into a major check on 
presidential power. This check is often vigorously enforced by law 
enforcement authorities who are nominally under the president’s control but 
who—as a matter of norms and practice—have come to enjoy functional 
independence. While scholars have for a long time pointed out that the 
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executive branch contains “internal checks” that may block the president 
from abusing power,246 the particular form that we have identified has 
attracted little notice. Yet as compared to other internal checks, such as the 
influence of the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel and of the 
various agency inspectors general, this one—with the threat of criminal 
liability that comes with it—is perhaps the most potent. 
 The question is whether this institutional development should be 
celebrated or bemoaned. The answer is not an easy one because both theory 
and historical experience tell us that investigators and prosecutors can abuse 
their power just as the president can. J. Edgar Hoover’s abuse of power at the 
FBI led to greater political control over that agency. The perceived abuse of 
the powers of the independent counsel led to its abolition. But the 
controversies surrounding Trump have revived memories of Watergate, 
which was the reason why the independent counsel statute was enacted in the 
first place. The pendulum may be set to swing in the other direction. That 
may be for the better: the president ought not stand above the criminal law. 
But when laws are vague and law enforcement authorities are independent, 
the risk on the opposite side is that all presidents will permanently be under 
investigation even when they do nothing wrong. Unless we think carefully 
about how the criminal law can be harmonized with the president’s 
constitutional responsibilities, we again run the risk that the pendulum may 
swing too far. 
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